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Politics v. The Cloister: Deciding When The Supreme
Court Should Defer To Congressional Factfinding
Under The Post-Civil War Amendments
Saul M. Pilchen *
"The Supreme Court has no right to make constitutional determinations based on unsound factual assumptions."'
Introduction
Lawyers know that questions of law and questions of fact are
important touchstones of sound constitutional policymaking. Marbuy
v.Madison2 teaches that the Supreme Court must ultimately determine the meaning of the law. 3 But who should determine the facts?
This article considers one aspect of that question by exploring
whether or to what extent the Court should defer to (i.e., consider
itself bound by) congressional determinations of fact when those facts
are used to justify legislation "enforcing" the post-Civil War
4
amendments.
In the past quarter century, the enforcement clauses of the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments have been invoked by
Congress, the Court, and litigants to support the constitutional validity of broad-based and controversial civil rights legislation, including
*
Law Clerk to Judge William C. Pryor, District of Columbia Court of Appeals. B.A.,
1979, University of Michigan; J.D., 1983, Georgetown University. Member, District of Columbia Bar.
I would like to thank Professors Mark V. Tushnet and Charles F. Abernathy, and Mr.
Ernest A. Renda, for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
1 The Supreme Court." Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm.
on theJudiciag, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1968) (statement of Senator Sam Ervin).
2 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
3 Specifically, "the law" refers to the Constitution and the laws of the United States.
Under its jurisdictional statute authorizing review ofstate court rulings, 28 U.S.C. § 1257, the
Supreme Court must accept as final a state court's intepretation of its own law. See Murdock
v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 630-33, 635 (1874). One commentator has stated
that Marbugy allows the Court to expound upon the law "in a universal sense, not merely as a
rule of decision, and with definitiveness, not merely as an expositor coordinate with the other
two branches of government." Hazard, The Supreme Court as a Legislature, 64 CORNELL L.
REV. 1, 7 (1978).
4 Each of the post-Civil War constitutional amendments, 13th, 14th, and 15th, has a
clause granting Congress the power to enforce its provisions by "appropriate legislation." E.g.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2 ("Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.").
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the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 5 the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (as
amended), 6 the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act of 1975 (as amended), 7 and the "minority business enterprise" section of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977.8 Because of the nature and impact of such legislation, contemporary use
of the enforcement power almost inevitably entails either an alteration of traditional federal-state relations, or a reexamination of what
constitutes proper treatment of disadvantaged minority groups by
private individuals and government.
This article recognizes that Congress' enforcement power is plenary.9 In ratifying enforcement legislation, however, the Court invariably emphasizes that Congress had before it, as a "factual
predicate"' 0 to passage, evidence sufficient to isolate or rationally
speculate as to the existence of unremedied violations of the substantive amendments." A "factfinding" theory of Congress' enforcement
power, resting on two assertions, has emerged from the cases. The
first assertion posits that Congress has a primary legislative role
under the enforcement clauses based upon its finding as a matter of
fact actual or potential violations of the substantive amendments.
The second assertion holds that this congressional preeminence is justifiable within our constitutional scheme because Congress has an institutional or structural advantage over the courts in finding and
evaluating the facts. Proponents of the factfinding theory claim that
under the post-Civil War amendments, congressional findings must
be binding on the Supreme Court when the constitutionality of en5 Ch.31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976)). The Civil Rights Act, as used
to prevent private individuals from discriminating in the sale or lease of real property, was
upheld as a valid enforcement of the 13th amendment in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392
U.S. 409, 437-44 (1968).
6 Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1976)). For a discussion of the cases upholding the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act, see notes 36-141
infia and accompanying text.
7 Pub. L. No. 94-103, 89 Stat. 486 (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. § 6000 (1976 & Supp.
II (1978)). In construing the scope of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance Act, the
Supreme Court determined that Congress did not intend the Act to be an "enforcement" of
the 14th amendment. Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 22 (1981)
(Act a "typical funding statute"). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had concluded
that the Act was an appropriate enforcement of the 14th amendment. 451 U.S. at 9.
8 Pub. L. 95-28, 91 Stat. 116 § 103(0(2) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6707 (1976)). The
Supreme Court upheld the Public Works Employment Act under both the commerce clause
and the enforcement clause of the 14th amendment in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,
472-92, 517-22 (1980).
9 See, e.g., notes 54-56 infra and accompanying text.
10 EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054, 1064 n.18 (1983).
11 See notes 16-162 infra and accompanying text for discussion of this doctrine.
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forcement legislation is considered.12 Currently, the factfinding theory is cited by proponents of the most recent enforcement legislation
to be considered by Congress, the "human life" bill.' 3 This bill, now
pending in the 98th Congress, is an attempt to overturn Roe v. Wade
by affording unborn "persons" equal protection and due process of
law under the fourteenth amendment. 1 4 The legislation is predicated
upon a determination by Congress that fetuses, very probably, constitute "actual human life." 1 5
This article examines the factfinding theory in order to understand better the Supreme Court's proper function when reviewing
enforcement legislation. The article attempts to expose flaws in the
factfinding theory by clearing away the rhetorical murkiness upon
which it rests. First, the article traces the development of the enforcement power from a tool occasionally used to ratify judicial interpretations of the post-Civil War amendments' mandates, to a fount
of legislation exceeding judicial doctrine. This historical survey includes consideration of the several scholarly explications of the
factfinding theory, including that which presaged the human life bill.
Second, the article critizes the factfinding theory by pointing out
that, as a general proposition, the institutional capabilities of Congress and the courts to find and use facts do not differ sufficiently to
justify the realignment of power witnessed during the enforcement
clauses' modern period. After examining in detail factfinding proce12 See Galebach, A Human Lfte Statute, HUM. LIFE REV., Winter 1981, at 5, 8. ("If Congress draws the line at conception, the courts have no independent basis on which to draw a
[different] line. . . 2"). Cf. Cox, The Role of Congress in ConstitutionalDeterminations,40 U. CIN.
L. REV. 199, 226 (1971) ("Today, one of the major questions of constitutional theory and
practice is whether the congressional power to make binding determinations upon questions
of fact and degree, acknowledged under the commerce clause, applies to legislation enacted
by Congress 'to enforce' the fourteenth amendment.").
13 See note 146 inra. The enforcement power may take on new importance as "pro-life"
proponents turn to Congress for assistance. See Ending the Fight, Nat'l LJ., June 27, 1983, at
10, col. 1 (abortion issue "should be widely debated in Congress"; President Reagan quoted as
saying issue "must be resolved by democratic process"). The impracticability of persuading
the requisite two-thirds majority to ratify a "pro-life" constitutional amendment, U.S.
CONsT. art. V (amendment procedure); see Senate Sets Back Anti-Abortion Cause, Wash. Post,
June 29, 1983 at Al, col. 2 (Senate rejected amendment 50-49 in floor vote), may enhance the"
desirability of legislation resembling the "human life" bill. For recent Court clarifications of
state restrictions on abortion and affirmations of the basic right articulated in Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973), see Simopoulos v. Virginia, 103 S. Ct. 2532 (1983); Planned Parenthood
Ass'n of Kansas City v. Ashcroft, 103 S. Ct. 2517 (1983); City of Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983).
14 Cf. note 144 infa (explaining theory behind bill).
15 Several days of hearings were held on the question of when human life begins. See
generally The Human Life Bill- Hearingson S 158, Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the
Senate Comm. on theJudiciag, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
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dures used by legislatures and courts, the section concludes that both
branches of government possess certain institutional strengths and
weaknesses with regard to ascertaining and evaluating facts. In order
to determine which branch is superior in a particular case, one must
look to the type of facts being found, or the type of matter being
decided.
Third, the article continues the criticism of the factfinding theory by arguing more broadly that it is unhelpful to frame the enforcement power controversy in terms of factfinding ability. This is
because the term "fact" has little meaning in and of itself. Labeling
a matter one of "law" or "fact" is not a hard and fast jurisprudential
characterization. The concepts lurking behind these terms historically have realigned themselves when it was determined, as a matter
of some other policy, that certain functions should be performed by
new or merely different institutions. This section then examines the
development of three areas of the law (national economic legislation,
administrative practice, and habeas corpus) in order to illustrate that
an argument for a "law" or "fact" label may tell less about the proponent's analysis of the nature of the matter so characterized than
about his opinion as to which branch of government should have the
final say. Indeed, resolving the issue of which branch will have the
last word regarding the "facts" often determines which branch will
decide the underlying legal or political questions.
The third part of this article thus posits that users of the
factfinding theory may characterize a certain matter as one of "fact"
because they have made a value judgment that certain issues should
be resolved through the political process. The article concludes,
then, that the factfinding theory is ultimately conclusory and cannot
be used by itself persuasively to justify a broad reading of congressional power under the enforcement clauses. What must first be debated each time that Congress seeks to use its enforcement power in a
new way or in a new area is a different question, namely, whether the
issue being raised should be resolved by Congress alone, effectively
unhindered by the Supreme Court.
I.

Facts in Constitutional Adjudication: The Enforcement
Clauses And the Factfinding Theory of Enhanced
Congressional Power

Congress often uses legislative facts' 6 to support controversial ex16 Legislative facts are "those which have relevance to legal reasoning and the lawmaking process, whether in the formulation of a legal principle or ruling by a judge or court or in
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ercises of its power.' 7 Several modern cases show that where Congress forges a chain of facts between the statutory means and
constitutional ends, the Supreme Court will ratify unprecedented
legislation.18 For example, the National Labor Relations Act of
193519 and the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 193820 both used the
commerce clause to regulate areas that previously had been held to
be outside congressional authority.2 ' The legislative histories of these
acts made the required nexus of a "substantial relation to interstate
commerce" 22 apparent to the Court.23 Another commonly cited exthe enactment of a legislative body." FED. R. EVID. 201.3[1](a) advisory committee note. See
generally C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 328, 331 (2d ed. 1972).
Professor Davis illustrated the variations, strengths, and weaknesses of legislative facts by
listing six scales upon which the certainty of such facts are measured:
(1) from narrow and specific facts to broad and general facts,
(2) from central or critical facts to background or peripheral facts,
(3) from readily accepted assumptions or facts to controversial assumptions or
facts,
(4) from factual propositions that are almost entirely factual to somewhat factual propositions that are mixed with judgment, policy, or political preference,
(5) from provable facts to facts that can be neither proved nor disproved and
therefore must be found through legislating the facts, presuming them, imposing the
burden on one party, or making an informed or uninformed guess, and
(6) from facts about immediate parties or facts that are known only or mainly
by them to facts having no relation to immediate parties.
Davis, Facts in Lawmaking, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 931, 932 (1980). These scales offer a useful
guide when this article examines the use of the "fact" characterization as a surrogate for
determining the proper allocation of power between branches of government. See notes 256372 infra and accompanying text.
17 The general rule is that Congress need not rely on any factfinding to support legislation. Davis, supra note 16, at 932; cf.United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152
(1938) (court should presume existence of facts supporting "regulatory legislation'). In practice, however, this rule does not seem applicable to legislation passed pursuant to the enforcement power. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. at 477-78 (1980); see also EEOC v.
Wyoming, 103 S.Ct. at 1064 n.18 (1983) (Court looks for "factual predicate" of enforcement
legislation).
18 See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding public accommodations title of Civil Rights
Act of 1964 as a valid exercise of Congress' power under the commerce clause); cf.Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (upholding minority business "set aside" for federal funds
used in construction contracts).
19 Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1976)).
20 Pub. L. No. 52-430, 52 Stat. 31 (1938) amended by Act of May 26, 1941, Pub. L. No.
55-74, ch. 133, 55 Stat. 203 (1941) (current version at 7 U.S.C. § 1321 (1976)).
21 See general4y United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (holding that the specific tax in
question is unconstitutional, but giving examples of Congress' wide power in this area); Bailey
v. Drexel Furniture (Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20 (1922) (same).
22 This was the test developed by the Supreme Court to determine whether a subject was
properly regulated under the commerce power. See notes 267-79 infra and accompanying
text.
23 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1936); Wickard v. Filburn,
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ample is the Civil Rights Act of 1964,24 in support of which testimony and data compiled by Congress established that segregation in
privately-owned facilities open to the public 25 affected the national

economy. 26 The Supreme Court upheld, as applied, these examples
of labor, farm, and civil rights legislation, which were supported by
27
congressional factfinding under the commerce clause.
Facts also are used by Congress to support legislation under the
post-Civil War amendments. 28 Prior to 1965, however, the enforcement power was not often invoked by Congress, 29 perhaps because its
scope had not been broadly construed by the Court. 30 The history of
the enforcement clauses 31 is more controversial and less well-documented than that of the commerce clause. 32 As the push for national
317 U.S. 11, 125 (1942). See also United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 upheld).
24 Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. II, 78 Stat. 241, 243 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000 to 2000a-6
(1976)).
25 Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. at 304-05; Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. at 246.
26 Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. at 299-301; Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. at 252-53.
27 See notes 18 and 23 supra (cases cited).
28 See, e.g., notes 36-60 infra and accompanying text (Voting Rights Act).
29 The post-Civil War amendments were invoked by Congress shortly after the Civil War
to support civil rights legislation, but not again until 1957. The 19th century acts were the
Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (14th amendment); Civil Rights (Ku Klux
Klan) Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (14th and 15th amendments); Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch.
99, 16 Stat. 433 (15th amendment); Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (13th,
14th and 15th amendments); Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (13th amendment).
The modern acts were the Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 1975 (1976)); and the Civil Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat.
241, (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1976)).
30 In the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883), the Court held that Congress was
without power under the 14th amendment to proscribe private conduct independent of state
action. The enforcement clause was not interpreted to give Congress power to legislate "upon
subjects which are within the domain of state legislation . . . [or to] create a code of municipal law for the regulation of private rights." Id.
31 See note 4 supra.
32 It is long settled that the drafters of the commerce clause intended to place regulation
of the economy in the hands of the federal government. In fact, the absence of a commerce
clause in the Articles of Confederation was itself a prime reason for calling the constitutional
convention. See Stern, That Commerce Which Concerns More States Than One, 47 HARV. L. REV.
1335, 1337 (1934). Recently, however, a difference of opinion on this point has emerged on
the Court. Compare EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S.Ct. at 1064-68 (opinion of Stevens, J.) with id
at 1075-81 (opinion of Powell, J.).
On the other hand, the tumultuous history of the Reconstruction period and the contradictory legislative history of the post-Civil War amendments provide no clear answers as to
their intended scope or purposes. Compare R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977),
with Dimond, Strict Construction andJudicizlReview of RacialDiscrimination Underthe Equal Protection Clause: Meeting Raoul Berger on Interpretivist Grounds, 80 MICH. L. REV. 462 (1982). Com-
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civil rights legislation gained momentum, however, determining the
modern reach of the enforcement power posed questions for the
Supreme Court analogous to those presented by New Deal legislation
under the commerce clause. Much like the commerce clause, the
thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments purported to give
the national government authority over matters which previously
had been thought to lie exclusively within the states' police power.33
In both areas, preexisting doctrine appeared to preclude expansive
construction of the powers granted to Congress.3 4 Perhaps because of
these similarities, and in view of its successful broadening of the com35
merce clause's reach in part through the use of legislative facts,
Congress presented a detailed empirical case for its first unprecedented use of the post-Civil War amendments' enforcement power in
modern times.
A.

Using Facts to Zdenti Constitutional Violations
Under the Post-Civil War Amendments

In South Carolina v. Katzenbach,36 ("South Carolina") the Supreme
Court unanimously 37 upheld portions of the Voting Rights Act of

196538 in an opinion which ratified a broad exercise of congressional
power under the fifteenth amendment. 39 The Act's legislative history
contained both legislatively and judicially documented cases of votpare also the history of the 14th amendment as viewed by Justice Harlan in Oregon v.
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 156-209 (1970), with the views of Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall, id. at 251-78. Cf Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. at 508-10 (Powell, J., concurring)
(reviewing legislative history of 14th amendment's enforcement clause).
Perhaps the recorded history of the post-Civil War amendments has not conclusively
limited their scope in modem times for yet another reason. One author has pointed out that
interpretations of ambiguous historical records must inevitably be colored by both professional and personal biases of the interpreter. See Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Dowtm" A
Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Trilees, 96 HARV. L. REv. 781, 793 (1983).
33 See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 453 (1976).
34 United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895), and United States v. Butler, 297
U.S. 1 (1936), blocked congressional regulation of manufacturing under the commerce
clause. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), and Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879),
precluded Congress from legislating beyond judically-imposed standards under the post-Civil
War amendments.
35 See note 18 supra (cases cited).
36 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
37 Justice Black agreed with the Court that the coverage formula of the Voting Rights
Act was constitutional, id. at 355, but believed that the preclearance section of the Act was
unconstitutional because it did not insure ajusticiable case or controversy necessary to invoke
article III court review. Id. See note 51 injfa and accompanying text (explaining preclearance
procedure).
38 Pub: L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1976)).
39 The 15th amendment's proscription reads: "The right of the citizens of the United
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ing discrimination 40 supported by voluminous data. 41 The data
showed that far fewer blacks than whites were registered to vote in
certain states42 and pointed towards blatant racial discrimination as
the reason for this disparity. 43 The record constructed by Congress
was unimpeachable; in the South Carolina litigation, the facts were
44
undisputed.
The Voting Rights Act was a controversial and unprecedented
method of enforcing the fifteenth amendment because its sanctions
were invoked prior to judicial determination of a constitutional violation. 45 The act used data not merely to justify its link to the Constitution, but also to trigger its penalty provisions. By distilling
threshold criteria from legislative facts, 46 Congress created a scheme
whereby probable racial discrimination in voting could be identified
and eliminated. If the statute's threshold criteria existed, 4 7 the sanctions applied. 41 The statutory "trigger" provided that a jurisdiction
in which less than fifty percent of eligible voters were registered, and
literacy tests or other preregistration devices were used, could not use
such tests or devices for the next five years. 49 Federal examiners were
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
40 Hearings on HR. 6400 before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciaoy, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess.; Hearingson S 1564 Before the Senate Comm. on theJudiciay, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1964). The South Carolina Court pointed out that many of the facts Congress found were also
amassed by courts in the course of litigation brought to combat racial discrimination in voting. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 309 n.5.
41 The data documented how many blacks were registered in various states, how many
actually voted, and what types of questions were asked on the literacy tests administered. See
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 310-15.
42 Id. at 313.
43 See, e.g., id. at 312 nn.12-13.
44 Id. at 307.
45 The "trigger" formula, discussed at note 46 infra, did not require a judicial finding of
voting discrimination. Circumstantial evidence, provided by the presence of the threshold
criteria, was sufficient.
46 Prior to the South Carolina litigation, the Attorney General determined that literacy
tests were the principal devices used by states to deny the franchise to blacks. 383 U.S. at 312.
This was probably because a host of other strategems had been declared illegal by the courts.
See id. at 311-12. See note 49 infra and accompanying text for criteria used in § 4(b) of the
Voting Rights Act to trigger sanctions.
47 The Attorney General and the Director of the Census were authorized to determine,
respectively, whether literacy tests or similar devices were present, and if less than 50% of
eligible voters were registered. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437,
438 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1981 & Supp 1983)). These findings were not
reviewable in any court and were final upon publication in the Federal Register. Id.
48 See note 51 infra and accompanying text (describing sanctions).
49 Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 § 4(a) (1965) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b
(1981 & Supp 1983)).
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authorized to register voters and supervise elections in covered jurisdictions, 50 and violators were required to preclear voting law amendments with either the Attorney General or a federal district court in
Washington.5 1 South Carolina presented the question whether enactment of the sections of the Voting Rights Act "properly before the
Court" 52 constituted an appropriate exercise of "powers under the
' 53
Fifteenth Amendment . . .with relation to the States.

The Court first held that the enforcement clause of the fifteenth
amendment was analogous to the necessary and proper clause, 5 4 and,
therefore, the standard of review articulated by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maglyand55 would be used to determine the Act's
validity.56

As part of its review, the Court noted that the statute's

trigger stemmed from Congress' possession of "reliable evidence of
actual voting discrimination in a great majority of the States" covered by the Act. 5 7 The trigger criteria, therefore, was "relevant to the

problem of voting discrimination. 58 After recognizing and referring
repeatedly 59 to this congressionally-forged link between the statute
and the Constitution, the Court upheld the Act as an appropriate
50

Id., Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 § 7.

51 Id.§ 5.
52 The Court stated that it would only pass on sections of the Voting Rights Act challenged in a particular case. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 316-17. The Act's
severability provision made this possible. See Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 § 19, (1965)
(current version at 42 U.S.C. 1973p (1981)).
53 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 324.
54 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 provides that Congress shall have power "[t]o make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution [other congressional
powers], and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."
55 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). In McCulloch, ChiefJustice Marshall supported strong
national authority by construing the necessary and proper clause broadly to allow Congress
to incorporate the Bank of the United States. Id. at 400. Marshall established an extremely
low standard of judicial review under the clause saying: "let the end be legitimate, let it be
within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the
constitution, are constitutional." Id. at 421. One commentator suggested that this deferential
standard of review should be tightened in order to limit the breadth of Congress' enforcement
power under the 14th amendment. See Note, Toward Limits on CongressionalEnforcement Power
Under the Civil War Amendments, 34 STAN. L. REv. 453, 456-60 (1982).
56 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 326.
57 Id. at 329.
58 Id.
59 See id at 309-15. Because no facts were at issue in South Carolina, id. at 307, it was
significant that the Court devoted one full section of its opinion to a review of the legislative
history which pointed to "an insidious and pervasive evil which had been perpetuated in
certain parts of our country through unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution."
Id. at 309. See also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. at 478 (recitation of legislative facts).
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enforcement of the fifteenth amendment. 60
Later in the 1965 term, the Court in Katzenbach v. Morgan6 1 considered the constitutionality of enforcement legislation not directly
supported by legislative fact. Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act
provided that citizens educated through the sixth grade in "American-flag schools" in a language other than English could not be dis62
enfranchised because of their inability to read or write English.
The legislative history indicated that section 4(e) had been added to
the act with the sole intent of enfranchising Puerto Rican citizens
living in New York City. 6 3 In effect, section 4(e) nullified a New
64
York statute requiring voters to be literate in English.
Unlike the trigger at issue in South Carolina,65 neither Congress
nor the courts possessed data suggesting that the New York literacy
requirement had been or was currently being enforced in a discrimi67
natory fashion.6 6 Justice Brennan, writing for all but two justices,
60 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 337. One reason why evidence was readily
compiled by Congress, and viewed by the Court as supporting appropriate legislation to enforce the 15th amendment, was because of that amendment's straightforward admonition.
Unlike the "majestic generalities" of the 14th amendment, the 15th amendment does not
speak of "due process" or "equal protection." It proscribes racial discrimination in voting,
pure and simple. See note 107 injfa (discussing relative certainty of constitutional terms).
Where the data was unassailable, as in South Carolina, the 15th amendment's prohibition
clearly applied. The state's behavior (racially discriminating in denying citizens the right to
vote) fell exactly within the proscription of the 15th amendment. Congress had reliable evidence of widespread use of literacy tests, id. at 312, 331, and of almost total elimination of
blacks from voting rolls, id. at 313, from which it could rationally infer that a significant
danger of discrimination existed. Id. at 329. The Voting Rights Act was, therefore, an appropriate exercise of Congress' express powers under the 15th Amendment. Id. Under McCulloch's standard of appropriateness, se note 55 supra, the Court had little choice but to uphold
the statute.
61 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
62 See id. at 643.
63 Id. at 645 n.3.
64 The Constitution of New York also required that voters read and write English. See id.
at 644-45 n.2.
65 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 309-15 for a summary of the "voluminous" legislative history of the Voting Rights Act.
66 In his opinion for the Court, Justice Brennan presented evidence that New York instituted its literacy requirement for ethnocentric reasons. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S.
at 654. However, the evidence consisted of a few comments made by a single legislator in
1916, id., and no evidence established a current discriminatory purpose for or application of
the tests, see id at 655-5 7. But see Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. at 501 (Powell, J., concurring) (explaining Morgan's holding as upholding remedial legislation based upon congressional finding of impermissible discrimination).
Although a possible explanation for Morgan's holding is that § 4(e) was prophylactic legislation designed to protect Puerto Ricans-a discrete and insular minority without political
representation-from future invidious discrimination, see notes 80-81 infra and accompanying
text, the record and wording of the state statutes point to the conclusion that New York was
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nevertheless upheld section 4(e) as appropriate legislation under the
68
fourteenth amendment.
As in South Carolina, the Morgan Court first held that the enforcement clause of the fourteenth amendment, like that of the fifteenth
69
amendment, was analogous to the necessary and proper clause.
The Court therefore was bound to review section 4(e) under McCulloch's principles. 70 Moving forward, the Court next established that
finding a state statute void under the Constitution was not a necessary precursor to judicial ratification of enforcement legislation preempting the statute. In Morgan, the question for the Court was not
"whether the judiciary would find that the Equal Protection Clause
itself nullifies New York's literacy requirement as . . applied, [but
rather whether] . . . Congress [could] prohibit the enforcement of

the state law by legislating under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. ' '7 1 The Court decided that section 4(e) was appropriate legislation to enforce the equal protection clause.
Justice Brennan advanced two independent rationales for ratifying section 4(e), one based on the statute's prophylactic purpose, the
other emphasizing the Court's proper deference to congressional
factfinding. In the first he characterized the statute as a prophylactic
not impermissibly discriminating against Puerto Ricans qua Puerto Ricans. Section 168(2) of
New York's election law provided that Puerto Ricans, educated in English, could satisfy the
literacy requirement even if they were educated in Puerto Rico. See Katzenbach v. Morgan,
384 U.S. at 644-45 & n.2. Discrimination seemed to be along language lines, not against a
racial or ethnic class per se. Justice Harlan was correct when he said "[t]here is simply no
legislative record supporting such hypothesized [racial] discrimination." Id. at 669 (Harlan,
J., dissenting).
Justice Harlan went on to say, however, that the Court had previously required a showing of actual discrimination before ratifying "congressional power. . . brought to bear on
constitutionally reserved state concerns." Id. This was not accurate as South Carolina considered a situation where congressional power was "brought to bear" without a showing of actual discrimination. The threshold criteria of the Voting Rights Act, see note 49 supra,
pointed only to probable-not actual-violations of the 15th amendment.
67 Justice Harlan dissented, in an opinion joined by Justice Stewart. Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. at 659.
68 Id. at 658.
69 Id. at 650; see also note 54 supra (quoting necessary and proper clause).
70 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 650; see note 55 supra (McCulloch interpretation of
clause).
71 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 649. This approach followed directly from South
Carolina, which established that Congress could prevent states from continuing certain activities even if the activities were, in the particular case, not held unconstitutional by the judiciary. The legislation was appropriate if designed to prevent actions which were, in the
abstract, unconstitutional-for example, racial discrimination in affording voting rights. See
Cox, ConstitutionalAdjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 103
(1966)
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measure. 72 The right to vote "secure[d] for the Puerto Rican community residing in New York non-discriminatory treatment by government-both in the imposition of voting qualifications and the
provision or administration of governmental services, such as public
schools, public housing and law enforcement. ' ' 7 3 Because the right to
vote was "preservative of all rights," 74 Justice Brennan held that section 4(e) was appropriate legislation to insure equal treatment. 75
Perhaps because discrimination in the provision of government services or benefits was "clearly within judicial construction" of the fourteenth amendment, 76 it was unimportant that no direct evidence
77
was presented showing state discrimination against Puerto Ricans.
The prophylactic rationale was derived from South Carolina,78 although in Morgan there was no record evidence to support the federal
statute. The findings attributed by the Court to Congress were, however, those reasonably subject to judicial notice:79 the group benefitted by section 4(e) was a racial or ethnic minority 8° without the right
72 See Burt, Miranda and Title If- A MorganaticMarriage, 1960 Sup. CT. REv. 81, 101.
73 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 652.
74 Id. (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)).
75 384 U.S. at 652-53.
76 Burt, supra note 72, at 10 1-02. See also note 85 infra and accompanying text (discussing
general legislative competence in area).
77 This reasoning allowed Congress to legislate to prevent violations of the amendments
from occurring. The scope of Congress' power was therefore broader than necessary to redress judicially-determined constitutional violations. Justice Brennan cited Houston, E. &
W.T.R. Co. v. United States (The Shreveport Case), 234 U.S. 342 (1914), as analogous to this
proposition. Shreveport established that Congress could, under its power to regulate interstate
commerce, also regulate intrastate matters which affected interstate commerce. The analogy-although strained-illustrates that the necessary and proper clause is a positive grant of
power to Congress.
78 383 U.S. at 301. See notes 36-60 supra and accompanying text. Oddly, however, this
part of the Morgan opinion did not refer to South Carolina.
79 The point here is not that the Court judicially noticed the circumstances identified in
the text. Rather, the findings attributed to Congress's determination of the need for prophylactic legislation were similar in kind to facts judically noticeable. The Federal Rules of Evidence allow judicial notice of the following types of facts:
A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is
either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2)
capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questioned.
FED. R. EvID. 201. That New York's Puerto Ricans were a disenfranchised racial or ethnic
minority was a fact similar to those comprehended by Rule 201 as judicially noticeable. See
Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 479-80 (1954) (evidence shows that persons of Mexican
descent separate class from whites). See also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 501 (1980)
(Powell, J. concurring) (Morgan based on Congress' finding that "members of this minority
group had suffered governmental discrimination").
80 Cf. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. at 153 n.4 (discrete and insular
minority).
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to vote. 8 ' Enfranchising the minority was a rational way to prevent
judicially-proscribed state discrimination from occurring. As in South
Carolina, a constitutional violation in a particular case to which the
statute applied did not first have to be judicially determined; sufficient circumstances were present to support the legitimacy of the legislation under the McCulloch test.

B. Facts Pointing to the Presence of Substantive Rzhts
Justice Brennan's second rationale in Morgan represented "a
strikingly novel form of judicial deference to congressional power.18 2
The Court hypothesized that in passing section 4(e) of the Voting
Rights Act, Congress legislated pursuant to its own judgment that
denying the franchise to those educated through the sixth grade in

American flag schools, notwithstanding their lack of English literacy,
was a denial of equal protection. 83 The enforcement power allowed
Congress to legislate against a practice that it believed violated the
Constitution, regardless of whether the Court would agree. 84 Citing
81 Cf id. (curtailing operation of political process).
82 Cox, supra note 71, at 106.
83 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 656.
84 Justice Brennan's identification of this definitional authority, by which Congress can
both define a constitutional violation and then legislate against it under the enforcement
power, caused Justice Harlan to write in dissent:
In effect the Court reads § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as giving Congress the
power to define the substantive scope of the Amendment. If that indeed be the true
reach of§ 5, then I do not see why Congress should not be able as well to exercise its
§ 5 "discretion" by enacting statutes so as in effect to dilute equal protection and
due process decisions of this Court."
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 668 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court answered this objection in the now-famous footnote 10:
Contrary to the suggestion of the dissent . . . § 5 does not grant Congress
power to exercise discretion in the other direction and to enact "statutes [which]
. . . dilute equal protection and due process decisions of this Court." We emphasize
that Congress' power under § 5 is limited to adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of the Amendment; § 5 grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate or
dilute these guarantees. Thus, for example, an enactment authorizing the States to
establish racially segregated systems of education would not be-as required by
§ 5-a measure "to enforce" the Equal Protection Clause since that clause of its own
force prohibits such state laws.
Id. at 651-52 n.10.
As stated, it is not clear at first glance how to determine whether particular legislation
serves the protective purposes of the 14th amendment. This is especially true when the congressional action touches upon issues involving rights in conflict, e.g., the "human life" bill.
See notes 142-62 in/a and accompanying text. The example of segregated educational systems, given in Morgan'sfootnote 10, suggests that the proper benchmark is to what the Court
has interpreted the 14th amendment to require. This is because, contrary to Justice Brennan's assertion, the equal protection clause does not require anything "of its own force." See
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South Carolina, the Morgan Court noted that the operation of literacy
tests was one area to which Congress brought "a specially informed
legislative competence."'8 5 Because of this, Congress had a legitimate
claim to "weigh the . . . competing considerations" underlying a

conclusion that New York's literacy test was invidiously discrimina86
tory in its application to the Puerto Rican population.
Justice Harlan, in an opinion joined by Justice Stewart, emphatically dissented. He felt that Morgan's holding, particularly when
based upon its second rationale, altered the traditional functions of
the judiciary and legislature by allowing Congress to determine as a
substantive constitutional matter that the equal protection clause
was violated by a state action which the Court had not declared unconstitutional. 87 Under the scheme of the post-Civil War amendments, he argued, the threshold determination of unconstitutional
state action belonged to the Court. 88 Although Justice Harlan adPlessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) ("separate but equal" does not violate 14th amendment). If the footnote's principle presents an effective limit on congressional enforcement
power, reference must be made to the Court's interpretations of the 14th amendment. The
Court has implicitly adopted this view. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 102 S. Ct.
3331, 3340-41 (1982). Read this way, Morgan presented a judicial limit to Congress' ability to
both define and enforce substantive 14th amendment violations. This could pose a serious
constitutional barrier to the "human life" bill. See notes 142-62 infra and accompanying text.
The drafter of the bill did not address the problem beyond asserting that the bill would
expand, and not dilute, 14th amendment rights. Galebach, supra note 12, at 13.
85 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 656. The "legislative competence" was presumably gained by Congress when it drafted other sections of the Voting Rights Act, because no
findings in the Act's legislative history were specifically offered in support of § 4(e). The
Court apparently believed that because Congress was, generally, informed about elections
and discrimination, it could reasonably find that § 4(e) was needed to redress a constitutional
violation. Cf. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 502-03 (Powell, J., concurring) (cumulative knowledge, gained from evidence gathered pursuant to prior legislative efforts, sufficient
to support current legislation).
86 384 U.S. at 656.
87 Id. at 666-68.
88 Id. at 666. Justice Harlan cited Expartr Virginia and South Carolina for this proposition,
but only the former supports his analysis. In Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879), the Court
upheld a federal law that mandated: "No citizen, possessing all other qualifications. . . shall
be disqualified for service as a grand or petit juror in any court of the United States, or of any
state, on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude .... " Id. at 344. The
Court stated, as a precursor to its holding, that "the 14th Amendment secures,. . . to colored
men, when charged with criminal offenses against a State, an impartial jury trial by jurors
indifferently selected . . . without discrimination against such jurors because of their color."
Id at 345 (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879)). The federal statute thus
prohibited action that was judicially determined to be unconstitutional, in keeping with Justice Harlan's analysis in Morgan. In South Carolina, however, the statutory sanctions came into
effect when it was administratively determined that literacy tests were being used and that
less than 50% of eligible voters were registered. See note 47 supra. This determination did not
constitute a judicially determined violation of the 15th amendment. It was, rather, only a
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mitted that "[d]ecisions on questions of equal protection . . . are
based not on abstract logic, but on empirical foundations," 89 he
maintained that no facts had been presented in the Morgan litigation,
or to Congress, establishing that the New York statute was used to
discriminate in an unlawful fashion. 90
[W]e have here not a matter of giving deference to a congressional estimate, based on its determination of legislative facts,
bearing on the validity vel non of a statute, but rather what can at
most be called a legislative announcement that Congress believes
a state law to entail an unconstitutional deprivation of equal protection. Although this kind of declaration is of course entitled to
the most respectful consideration, coming as it does from a concurrent branch and one that is knowledgeable in matters of popular political participation, I do not believe it lessens our
responsibility to decide the fundamental issue of whether in fact
the state enactment violates federal constitutional rights.9 '
Because he concluded that New York's literacy requirement did not
run afoul of the equal protection clause, 92 Justice Harlan concluded
that section 4(e) was an unsupportable exercise of the enforcement
93
power.
C.

A Rationalefor Enhanced CongressionalPower

Both branches of Morgan's holding generated much debate over

the scope of the enforcement power. Professor Cox, in an important
article written immediately after Morgan,94 stated that the judicial

deference embodied in the opinion "follows logically from familiar
principles of constitutional adjudication . . . . [I]t should prove a
happy innovation, relieving pressures upon the Court." 95 He pointed

out that judicial deference to congressional policy choices, even in
the absence of legislatively-determined facts, was in keeping with the
presumption of constitutionality and "a long line of precedents holdstatutory threshold that activated statutory sanctions. See notes 46-51 supra and accompanying text (explaining trigger criteria).
89 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 668.
90 Id at 669.
91 Id at 669-70.
92 Id at 664.
93 Id at 671.
94 Cox, supra note 71.
95 Id at 106. Later commentators were less sanguine. See Burt, supra note 72; Cohen,
CongressionalPower to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REv. 603 (1975);
Gordon, The Nature and Uses of CongressionalPower Under Section Five of the FourteenthAmendment to
Overcome Decisions of the Supireme Court, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 656 (1977); Note, Toward Limits on
CongressionalEnforcement Power Under the Civil War Amendments, 34 STAN. L. REv. 453 (1982).
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ing that a statute must be judged constitutional if any set of facts
which can reasonably be conceived would sustain it."96

Most importantly, Professor Cox justified Morgan's holding by
stressing the relative superiority of Congress over the Court in finding
and evaluating legislative facts. 9 7 Morgan's "chief legal antecedents"'9 8 were the modern commerce cases, in which holdings by the
Court as to the propriety of state regulation affecting interstate commerce were superceded when Congress passed contrary legislation
based upon different notions of how commerce should be regulated. 9 9
[Morgan] logically permits the generalization that Congress, in
the field of state activities and except as confined by the Bill of
Rights, has the power to enact any law which may be viewed as a
measure for correction of any condition which Congress might
believe involves a denial of equality or other fourteenth amendment rights. 10
Professor Cox noted that the Court's "conclusory but qualifying"
language of "reasonable relation" or "rational" was not present in
the Morgan opinion, 0 '1unlike the public accommodations (commerce
clause)102 and voting rights cases.10 3 Quoting from the deferential

language used in the opinion, he suggested that:
It is sufficient that the law "may be viewed" as a measure for
securing equal protection and that the Court can "perceive a basis" upon which Congress might predicate its judgment ....
96 Cox, supra note 71, at 105.
97 Professor Cox noted: "Whether a state law denies equal protection depends to a large
extent upon finding an appraisal of the practical importance of relevant facts .... " Id at
106. In dissent in Morgan,Justice Harlan acknowledged, perhaps too readily, that "[d]ecisions
on questions of equal protection and due process are based not on abstract logic, but on
empirical foundations." 384 U.S. at 668. He maintained, however, that it was the Court's
perogative to insure that congressional action, was indeed, rationally based upon the legislative facts. The Morgan record, according to Justice Harlan, did not contain any legislative
facts. Id at 670.
98 Cox, supra note 71, at 107.
99 Id Compare, e.g., United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533
(1944) (striking down discriminatory state taxation statute under the commerce clause in the
absence of federal legislation), with Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin Ins. Comm'r, 328 U.S.
408 (1946) (upholding discriminatory state taxation law passed after congressional statute
authorized states to regulate subject matter as they saw fit).
100 Cox, supra note 71, at 107.
101 Id at 104.
102 Id (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964);
Katzenbach v. McClung, 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966)). See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 266 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment)
(describing rational basis test in commerce clause case).
103 Cox, supra note 71, at 104 (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324
(1966)).
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Evidently, the Court intends to validate any legislation under
section 5-at least any legislation dealing with state actionwithout judging the substantiality of its relation to a permissible

federal objective. 104

Professor Cox's interpretation of Morgan, in which Congress'
readings of the fourteenth amendment-based upon its experience in
finding facts-were used to support legislation preventing not-unconstitutional state action, justified a dramatic shift of power from the

Court to Congress. 10 5 This is because, as Morgan itself illustrated, the
"broad, elastic language"' 0

6

of the fourteenth amendment effectively

precluded principled judicial challenge to Congress' interpretation.
"Due process" and "equal protection" mean something to everyone;
they cannot be defined with exactitude.

0 7

As a result, they are sub-

104 Id at 104.
105 Other commentators tried to limit the Morgan principle. Professor Cohen, for example, distinguished between Congress' legislating in the areas of "liberty" and "federalism."
See Cohen, supra note 95, at 614. He allowed that Congress has plenary authority only in the
latter area. Id Such a division is not helpful, however, when a congressional statute affects
both federal-state relations (e.g., the ability of the federal government to tell the states that
they may once again regulate or prohibit abortion) and infringes upon individual rights (e.g.,
the woman's privacy right), as does the "human life" bill. Cf also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448
U.S. 448, 479 (opinion of Burger, C.J.) (minority "set aside" affects private nonminority contractors and state's use of federal funds).
Professor Gordon's thesis approached Morgan differently. He allowed Congress to legislate so as to alter constitutional holdings only when the Court's reading of the Constitution
rested upon "empirical" bases, and not when the interpretations rested upon "normative"
ones. Gordon, supra note 95, at 671. This analysis is too conclusory, however, because labeling a matter "empirical" (factual) or "normative" (judgmental) may only be a front for a
policy conclusion as to which branch of government should decide the matter, and not a
description of the intrinsic nature of the matter itself. See notes 256-372 infia and accompanying text. Moreover, if the matter ir subject to empirical measurement, see note 262 in/a, it is
theoretically possible that Congress may "incorrectly" redetermine the Court's findings-free
from judicial challenge-and thus possibly dilute rather than enforce the constitutional mandate. See notes 194-205 infa and accompanying text (institutional pressures in Congress leading to decisions made for reasons other than evaluation of merits). The theory thus
comprehends a result contrary to Morgan.
106 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 275 (1970).
107 At issue is the relative certainty of constitutional commands. The body of the Constitution contains language ranging from the extremely specific, see, e.g., U.S. CONST. art I, § 9,
cl.8 (no title of nobility shall be granted by United States), to the amorphous, see, e.g., art I,
§ 8, cl.1 (Congress may spend money for "general welfare"). Similarly, the amendments vary
in specificity. Compare amend. XXI (18th amendment "hereby repealed") with amend. VIII
("cruel and unusual punishments" prohibited). See a/so Burt, supra note 72, at 89 (comparing
"apparent specificity" of the 13th amendment with "great generality" of 14th amendment).
The 15th amendment's proscription against racial discrimination in voting is more specific (or at least directed against a more particularized evil) than are the 14th amendment's
twin guarantees of due process and equal protection. See note 60 upra. This may be why
commentators (other than Professor Cox) were troubled by unchecked congressional power
under the 14th, but not the 15th amendment. See, e.g., articles cited in note 95 supra. The
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ject to many reasonable interpretations, including those resulting
from vicissitudes of the political process.10 8 Professor Cox's enthusiastic interpretation of Morgan, based in part on congressional superiority in finding and using facts, admitted no limiting principle.10 9
Notwithstanding this, it resurfaced in the next major voting rights
case to reach the Supreme Court.
D.

The Rationale Advanced by the Justices

Oregon v. Mitchell"t° ("Oregon") considered several 1970 amendments to the Voting Rights Act." ' One of the amendments, in
which Congress lowered the voting age to eighteen in both federal
differing specificity of the post-Civil War amendments is also why Galebach's analogy of the
Voting Rights Act cases to the "human life" bill is not persuasive. See Galebach, supra note
12, at 8. In the former instance, the subject matter is rationally identifiable. In the latter, it
would be practically impossible for the Court to challenge Congress' reading of the 14th
amendment. See note 108 infra (noting multiplicity of rational interpretations of 14th
amendment).
108 The more amorphous a constitutional command, see note 107 supra, the more there
can be reasonable differences of opinion about what constitutes appropriate legislation to
enforce it. Compare South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 336 (15th amendment;
§ 6(b) of Voting Rights Act provides sufficient standards to guide Attorney General's discretion) with Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 206 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (14th amendment;
policy choice of Voting Rights Act amendments is one over which "men of good will can and
do reasonably differ"). Cf Schauer, An Essay on ConstitutionalLanguage, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REv.
797, 821-32 (1982) (viewing general terms in the Constitution as "value laden," and thus open
to different interpretations). When there is a plethora of reasonable opinions, the legislative
result is likely to be a result of political maneauvering. See notes 194-205 infra and accompanying text. The time and resources expended in thrashing out controversial policy solutions,
often not on the merits anyway, prompted one student of Congress to suggest that the national legislature is at its best when dealing with relatively noncontroversial matters. See L.
FROMAN, THE CONGRESSIONAL PROCESS 30 (1967).
109 See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 209 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (The "notion
of deference" expressed in Morgan would "make [Congress] a judge in its own cause."). See
also note 105 supra for other commentators' attempts to limit Morgan.
110 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
111 The 1970 amendments, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1971 note, 1973aa, 1973b, 1973c, (1970)), provided for a nationwide ban on literacy tests,
id tit. II, § 201, 84 Stat. 316; uniform absentee voting procedures and prohibitions on states'
disqualifying voters in national elections because of residency requirements; id. tit. II, § 202,
84 Stat. 316; and a voting age of eighteen in national and state elections, id tit. III, §§ 301,
302, 84 Stat. 318.
The literacy test ban was upheld by a unanimous Court, Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at
118, which deferred to Congress' judgment expressed in the legislative history of the amendments that such tests could have a discriminatory effect. There was some disagreement between the justices over which amendment's enforcement power was properly invoked by
Congress in support of the legislation. See, e.g., id at 132-34 (Black, J.; 14th and 15th amendments); id at 135 (Douglas J.; 14th amendment). The residency and absentee provisions were
upheld by all except Justice Harlan. Id at 118-19. The eighteen year-old vote provision was
upheld by a plurality of five, but only as applied to national elections. Id ; see note 140 infla.

[Vol. 59:3371

POLITICS V. THE CLOISTER

and state elections, 1 2 engendered sharp disagreement among the justices. The Court could not agree on a rationale for its holding that
lowering the voting age in federal but not state elections' 1 3 was
within Congress' enforcement power." 14 Neither branch of the Morgan opinion gained a majority of the Oregon Court, but the joint opinion of Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall (the "Brennan
coalition"), squarely presented a rationale based upon Congress'
factfinding prowess. This was met in a dissent by Justice Harlan.
The Brennan coalition opened its opinion with the South Carolina
and Morgan proposition that the Court on review must determine
only whether the 1970 amendment appropriately enforced the equal
protection clause;" 15 it need not decide whether the state age requirement violated the Constitution." 6 Reflecting Professor Cox's explanation of Morgan," t1 the opinion set the stage for its reliance upon
Congress' factfinding ability to justify ratification of the eighteen
year-old vote in both federal and state elections." 8 The Brennan coalition began its analysis by stating that Congress-unlike the federal
courts-was not bound to respect state factual determinations.' '9 Although federal courts must ratify state legislative classifications if
120
"any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify [them],"'
this deference stemmed from the nature of judicial review and was
not applicable to Congress when it acted to enforce the fourteenth
amendment. 12 ' Congress could make its own factual determinations
that implicated equal protection values and could disregard those
made by (or attributed to) the states. The functional justification for
112 See note 111 supra (citing statute).
113 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 118.
114 Id
115 Id
116 Id at 246.
117 See notes 94-104 supra and accompanying text.
118 See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 246 (opinion of Brennan, White & Marshall, JJ.)
("[Q]uestions of constitutional power frequently turn in the last analysis on questions of
fact.').
119 Id at 247-48.
120 Id at 247 (citing Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580, 584 (1935)).
The Brennan coalition noted that "the state of facts necessary to justify a legislative discrimination will of course vary with the nature of the discrimination involved." Id at 247 n.30.
Discrimination involving state regulation of business practices could be justified by administrative convenience, for example, id (citing Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487,
488-89 (1955)), whereas discrimination denying or burdening the exercise of a fundamental
constitutional right demands more pressing justification. Id ; ef United States v. Carolene
Prod. Co., 304 U.S. at 152-53 & n.4 (different standard of review for statutes which implicate
fundamental values or discrete and insular minorities).
121 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 247 (opinion of Brennan, White & Marshall, JJ.).
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this difference between the authority of Congress and the courts was
their relative ability to find and use facts:
The nature of the judicial process makes it an inappropriate forum for the determination of complex factual questions of the
kind so often involved in constitutional adjudication ....
Limitations stemming from the nature of the judicial process, however, have no application to Congress .

. .

. Should

Congress, pursuant to [its enforcement] power, undertake an investigation in order to determine whether the factual basis necessary to support a state legislative discrimination actually exists, it
need not stop once it determines that some reasonable men could
believe the factual basis exists. Section 5 empowers
Congress to
122
make its own determinations on the matter.
The opinion stated that Congress could reasonably have found facts
to support its judgment that lowering the voting age to eighteen was
an appropriate way to insure equal protection for the eighteen to
twenty-one year-old cohort, 123 notwithstanding the state's judgment.
There being "ample evidence" to support the appropriateness of
Congress' judgment, the Voting Rights Act amendment was held
valid, and the state age requirement was nullified under the
24
supremacy clause. 1
The Brennan coalition's opinion did not rest expressly on Morgan's second rationale-Congress' deciding as a substantive matter
that denying the vote to eighteen to twenty-one year-olds constituted
a violation of the equal protection clause. 125 Although the opinion
did imply that the deprivation was indeed invidious, 126 the argument
for ratifying the congressional policy was closer to Morgan's first
prong: Congress could give eighteen to twenty-one year-olds the vote
in order to prevent invidious discriminations, which the Court already had ruled unconstitutional, 127 from occurring. This rationale
122 Id at 247-48.
123 Id at 278-8 1; see id. at 242-46.
124 Id at 249. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 states: "This Constitution, and the laws of the
United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all the treaties made, or which
shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the
land. .. ."
The Brennan coalition cited no authority for the proposition that this clause, which is
aimed at keeping the laws and policies of the United States supreme, see Testa v. Katt, 330
U.S. 386 (1947), allows congressional factfinding to override that of the states.
125 See notes 83-86 supra and accompanying text.
126 See note 132 infra.
127 Id See notes 72-81 supra and accompanying text (discussing Morgan's first prong). An
interesting question thus implied was whether, by so reasoning, the Brennan coalition indicated that it believed that eighteen to twenty-one year-olds are a discrete and insular minority. Cf note 79 supra (explaining Morgan on discrete and insular minority grounds).
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was echoed by Justice Douglas in his separate concurrence. 128
The Brennan coalition's opinion obscured the distinction between ability to find facts and ability to decide as a matter of legislative policy that facts should be found, and (once found) to determine
what weight should be assigned to them. Congress did not discover
new facts to support its replacement of state voting requirements
with the 1970 amendment. The Brennan coalition disingenuously
implied that state legislatures did not know, for example, that eighteen year-olds are treated as adults in most state criminal proceedings,' 29 or that every state allows eighteen year-olds to marry. 130 The
issue simply was not relative factfinding ability; Oregon concerned
conflicting policies regarding whether eighteen year-olds should
vote.'13 Few if any states had set their voting age at twenty-one out
of ignorance; they simply did not think that, as a policy matter, the
right to vote should be based upon the same criteria as other legal
rights and responsibilities. The Brennan coalition did not, because it
could not, allege that the states' policy was founded upon an unrea32
sonable judgment. 1
In dissent, Justice Harlan took a different approach. He focused upon whether the states' or Congress' policy choice should be
preeminent under federalism principles, rather than examining Congress' ability to find and use facts. Justice Harlan's opinion 33 incorporated his historical analysis of the fourteeth amendment, from
which he concluded that the framers never intended the amendment
to "restrict the authority of the states to allocate their political power
as they see fit and therefore [the amendment] does not authorize
Congress to set voter qualifications, in either state or federal elections.' 134 For Justice Harlan, the intention of the framers was dispos128 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 135-52 (opinion of Douglas, J.).
129 Id. at 243 (opinion of Brennan, White & Marshall, JJ.).
130 Id. at 244.
131 This, of course, was Justice Harlan's view of the matter. See id. at 208-09 (Brennan
coalition prepared to set aside "unwise" state voting qualifications).
132 But see id. at 240, 241-46 (suggesting that statute granting franchise to "citizens 21 and
over while denying it to those between the ages of 18 and 21" might violate equal protection
clause regardless of reasonableness of state judgment).
133 Justice Harlan's answer to the plurality's view was partially unsatisfactory because it
was colored by an initial refusal to concede that the equal protection clause applied to nonracial legislative classifications. Id. at 200 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (equal protection clause not
applicable to discriminatory voter qualifications). But see id. at 150-52 (Douglas, J., appendix
to opinion) (citing cases in which state statutes not involving racial discrimination were invalidated on equal protection grounds).
134 Id. at 154. Both Justice Harlan's and the Brennan coalition's opinions contained historical reviews, which tried to ascertain the framers' intent regarding the proper scope of
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itive. 135 In response to the factfinding rationale set forth by the
plurality, he countered:
When my Brothers refer to "complex factual questions".., they
call to mind disputes about primary, objective facts dealing with
such issues as the number of persons between the ages of 18 and
21, the extent of their education, and so forth. The briefs of the
four States in these cases take no issue with respect to any of the
facts of this nature presented to Congress and relied on by [the
plurality].

.

.

. The disagreement in these cases revolves around

1 36
the evaluation of this largely uncontested factual material.

Whether education, maturity, and experience lead to a more intelligent exercise of the franchise, thus justifying the states' selection of
twenty-one as the minimum voting age, was not to Justice Harlan a
question merely of fact:
Whether or not this judgment is characterized as "factual," it
calls for striking a balance between incommensurate interests.
Where the balance is to be struck depends ultimately on the valas to
ues and the perspective of the decisionmaker. It is a matter
13 7
which men of good will can and do reasonably differ.
He concluded that the fourteenth amendment was not intended to
be a congressional tool for altering state or federal voting requirements,1 38 notwithstanding the assertion that Congress' factfinding
competence was superior to that of state legislatures or the courts. 139
Although Morgan's rationales did not receive the Court's imprimatur in Oregon, t 4° the principle allowing Congress to determine for
Congress' enforcement power under the 14th amendment. Justice Harlan concluded that the
amendment was not intended to be used by Congress to usurp the states' power to promulgate voting qualifications. Id. at 155-200. The Brennan coalition found that the turbulent
nature of the Reconstruction period did not permit an unequivocal interpretation of the
framers' intent on this point. Id. at 278. See note 32 supra (discussing historical ambiguity of
enforcement clauses).
135 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 155-200.
136 Id. at 206.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 207. See note 133 supra and accompanying text (Justice Harlan claiming equal
protection clause does not cover state voting regulations).
139 But see id. at 206-07 (opinion of Harlan, J.) (acknowledging weighing of policies underlying state election requirements not for Court (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226-330
(1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
140 The Brennan coalition and Justice Douglas found that pursuant to its enforcement
power, Congress could have determined that lowering the voting age in state and federal
elections was a proper way to insure equal protection for eighteen to twenty-one year olds, id.
at 144, 280-81. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Harlan, Stewart, and Blackmun refused to
adopt this rationale. They found that Congress was without authority to alter states' election
qualifications in state or federal elections, id. at 211-21, 288-89. Justice Black provided the
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itself whether violations of the Constitution exist has never been rejected by the Court. The first rationale of Morgan, which allowed
Congress to legislate based upon its findings and evaluations of fact
in order to prevent constitutional violations from occurring or con4
tinuing, has resurfaced from time to time in recent cases.' '
E. Applying the Factfmding Theoy: Protecting the Fetus
By Determining When Human Life Begins
Stephen H. Galebach recently hypothesized 42 that Congress
was empowered under the fourteenth amendment to overturn Roe v.
Wade' 43 ("Roe") by appropriate legislation. 44 Essentially, he suggested that Congress could do this by determining as a matter of fact
that human life begins at conception. 145 Galebach drafted a "human
life" bill incorporating this finding, a form of which is currently
14 6
pending in the 98th Congress.
Beginning with the proposition that the Constitution may afford
due process protection for the unborn depending "on how life is defined,"' 47 Galebach noted that the Roe Court "refused to decide
swing vote, in which he ratified the age change only in federal elections, id. at 118. His
rationale was unrelated to Morgan's reasoning, however.
141 See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. at 462-63 (Congress concluded that a minority "set
aside" was necessary to prevent and eliminate disproportionate minority participation in
public contracting.); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 177-78 (1980) (Congress
may prohibit not-unconstitutional voting practices in order to prevent states from usurping
15th amendment's guarantee.).
142 Galebach, supra note 12, at 5.
143 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
144 Although Galebach provided several arguments explaining how the "human life" bill
could supercede Roe v. Wade, the Senate bill which he drafted embodies the specific argument that, by including fetal life within the 14th amendment's purview, Congress will have
established a "compelling state interest" in the unborn sufficient to override the mother's
privacy right if the states should decide to do so. See 129 CONG. REC. S225, 229 (daily ed.
Jan. 26, 1983) (statement of Senator Jesse Helms). Congress' power to do this, in any context,
has been expressly rejected by one formerjustice of the Supreme Court. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 295 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See note 146 infra for text and current legislative
history of the "human life" bill.
145 Galebach, supra note 12, at 6-8.
146 S. 26, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S225 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1983). The
"human life" bill was originally introduced into the 97th Congress by Senator Helms, but it
did not reach the floor for a vote. S. 158, 97th Cong., Ist Sess., 127 CONG. REc. S287 (daily
ed. Jan. 19, 1981). Section 1 ofthe bill reads, in pertinent part: "[Congress finds that] present
day scientific evidence indicates a significant likelihood that actual human life exists from
conception . . . . [F]or the purpose of enforcing the obligation of the States under the 14th
amendment not to deprive persons of life without due process of law, human life shall be
deemed to exist from conception. . .; and for this purpose 'person' shall include all human
life as defined herein." Id.
147 Galebach, supra note 12, at 6.
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when human life begins and whether unborn children are human
life,"1 48 and concluded that this refusal was predicated upon thejudiciary's institutional inability to determine the facts.
On the beginnings of life, the Court observed [in Roe], there is a
"wide divergence of thinking." The question is "sensitive and
difficult." For such questions the judiciary has no suitable evidentiary standards to determine an answer. A judge could only
"speculate" on this difficult question. In short, the question
stands outside the scope of judicial competence .... 149
Galebach posited that the judiciary's institutional inability to decide
when human life begins explained why the Roe Court held that the
unborn were not persons under the fourteenth amendment.' 50 He
reasoned that Congress, under the enforcement clause, is the "most
appropriate" branch of government to decide as a matter of fact that
life begins at conception. If Congress did find after appropriate investigation that a fetus probably was "actual human life," then
under the enforcement power of the fourteenth amendment Congress
could decide that the fetus was entitled to due process before its life
was extinguished.' 5'
Galebach relied upon the voting rights cases 52 as precedent for
Congress' ability to include the unborn in the class of persons protected by the fourteenth amendment from even "constitutionally
proper state action."' 153 Relying on both rationales of Morgan, he
concluded that, given the institutional incompetence of the Court to
discover independently when human life begins, a congressional definition of "human life," and thereby of "persons," under section 5 of
the fourteenth amendment, must be binding on the Court. 5 4 He
148 Id.
149 Id. at 7 (quoting Roe v. Wade; footnotes omitted).
150 Id.
151 The argument stated:
The political department most appropriate to decide when life begins is Congress.
The enforcement clause of the Fourteenth Amendment expressly grants power to
Congress. When a term of the Fourteenth Amendment cannot be defined by the
judiciary in concrete application to a category of beings-here the unborn-then
the definition of that term by Congress is appropriate legislation to enforce the
Amendment.
Id. at 9.
152 City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112
(1970); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S.
301 (1966); Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959); see
Galebach, supra note 12, at 8.
153 Galebach, supra note 12, at 11-15.
154 Id. at 15-18.
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asserted that "the Court's prior definition of 'person' in Roe v. Wade
poses no greater barrier to congressional enforcement action than the
Lassiter [v. Northampton County BoardofElections] holding posed to Congress' nationwide prohibition of literacy tests."' 5 5
Galebach characterized the dissenting opinions in Morgan1 56 and
Oregon' 57 as seeking to reserve for the Court authority to determine
the Constitution's substantive content. 58 This obstacle did not preclude "human life" legislation, however, because the matter properly
fell into the category of situations in which Congress could supplement the Court's reading of the Constitution-where the constitutional interpretation rested upon the evaluation of legislative facts.' 59
155 Id. at 18. In Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959), the
Court held that literacy tests were not per se violative of either the 14th or the 15th amendments. Lassiter's impact was modified by the Voting Rights Act of 1965, see note 38 supra,
which provided for the suspension of tests if certain trigger criteria were satisfied. See note 46
supra and accompanying text. The Act was upheld in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383
U.S. 301 (1966). Literacy tests were banned nationwide for a five year period by the Voting
Rights Act amendments of 1970, see note 11 supra. This provision was upheld in Oregon v.
Mitchell 400 U.S. 112 (1970). The legislative history of the Act and its amendments suggested that Congress eventually banned the tests because it felt that the tests could be, and
were historically and currently, used to discriminate.
Galebach used these cases together as an example of Congress overruling one of the
Supreme Court's holdings by statute. Galebach, supra note 12, at 10-15. His use of the term
"overrule," however, is misleading because it is based upon an overbroad reading of Lassiter.
Congress, in the Voting Rights Act and its 1970 amendment, did not instruct the Court that,
as a matter of constitutional interpretation, Lassiter was decided incorrectly. In Lassiter, the
Court judged merely the constitutionality of literacy tests that were both neutral on their face
and were not alleged to be used in a discriminatory fashion. 360 U.S. at 53. The Lassiter
Court expressed no opinion of whether Congress could find a danger that literacy tests either
were being or could be used to discriminate racially in affording the franchise, and thereafter
ban their use. In upholding the Voting Rights Act in South Carohka and Morgan, the Court
held that Congress rationally decided that the danger existed and, therefore, could prohibit
the use of tests by statute. These cases did not ratify Congress' "overruling" of Lassiter. See
City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. at 175 (The Court in South Carolina saw no need to
overrule Lassiter.). Rather, South Carolina and Morgan decided only that in matters of racial
discrimination in voting, the "locus of power" to make policy based upon factfinding was
situated in Congress. Cf. Schrock & Welsh, Reconsidering The Constitutional Common Law, 91
HARV. L. REv. 1117 (1978) (describing Congress' power under commerce clause to decide
independently of the Court whether states can regulate in ways that burden interstate
commerce).
156 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 659 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
157 400 U.S. at 152 (opinion of Harlan, J.). See id. at 281 (opinion of Stewart, J.).
158 See Galebach, supra note 12, at 10.
159 Galebach noted: "To the extent 'legislative facts' are relevant to ajudicial determination, Congress is well equipped to investigate them, and such determinations are of course
entitled to due respect." Id. at 10 (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 668 (Harlan,
J., dissenting)). This, however, did not properly take into account the subsequent limitation
of this statement by Justice Harlan in Oregon v.Mitchell. See notes 136-37 supra and accompanying text (discussing evaluation of facts and balancing of policy).
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Galebach referred to Justice Harlan's statement in Morgan that equal
protection of the laws was "based not on abstract logic, but on empirical foundations,"' 160 to support his conclusion that the Court
should give dispositive effect to a congressional finding that life begins at conception, 6 1 regardless of congressional certainty about the
62

matter. 1

II.

Institutional Capacity to Find Facts

This section begins the critical examination of the factfinding
theory by surveying the institutional mechanisms used by legislatures
(primarily Congress) and federal courts to find and evaluate facts. It
establishes that, based upon currently available procedures for finding and evaluating facts, neither branch of government has an absolute claim to factfinding superiority. While legislatures have unique
structural capabilities for conducting far-reaching investigations that
are not possessed by courts, political pressures often inhibit impartial
evaluations of factual merits. On the other hand, although federal
courts have different factfinding tools than legislatures (including
some not usually available in legislatures), these tools are not inferior.
Moreover, because federal courts are relatively insulated from political hurly-burly, they may more readily use their factfinding procedures to make decisions based upon the merits. As a result, abstract
claims of Congress' factfinding superiority alone cannot justify the
broad interpretation given to the enforcement power outlined in the
previous section. Other variables may change the result.
A. Facts in Congress
Morgan's two rationales, 163 elaborated

by Professor Cox, 164

adopted by a plurality of justices in Oregon,165 and most recently used
by Galebach, 166 are based upon the presumption that legislatures
(more specifically Congress) are institutionally better able than
160 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 668, quoted in Galebach, supra note 12, at 10.
161 Galebach, supra note 12, at 10-11.
162 Id. at 12. The author focused on language in the enforcement clause cases that Congress may prohibit states from conduct which poses a "danger" to 14th or 15th amendment
rights or presents a "likelihood" of infringement. Id. at 12. This is the prophylactic rationale
disculssed in notes 72-81 supra and accompanying text.
163 384 U.S. at 652-56. See notes 72-93 supra and accompanying text.
164 See Cox, supra note 71, at 102-08; Cox, supra note 12, at 228-31; notes 95-105 supra and
accompanying text.
165 See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 229; notes 115-28 supra and accompanying text.
166 See notes 142-62 supra and accompanying text.
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courts to determine, organize, and comprehend facts.' 67 A survey of
the procedures by which legislatures and courts find facts, however,
argues strongly that there are only nominal differences in their
factfinding capacities.
Although legislators normally can vote for or against legislation
merely upon their hunches, ideally they should study the facts underpinning their work.' 68 Consequently, although not enumerated in
article I, Congress has been understood to have plenary power to investigate. The power springs from the necessary and proper
clause's' 69 grant of authority needed "to make the express powers effective" and from the article I, section 1, grant of "legislative Powers."1 70 The power to investigate includes, for example, the court-like
authority to subpoena witnesses and compel their attendance.' 71 By
1857 Congress made a witness's refusal to testify before congressional
172
committees a federal offense.
The Supreme Court has imposed few substantive limitations on
Congress' power to investigate, 173 even though the authority has
sometimes been abused.' 74 The requirement that congressional in167 See generally Davis, supra note 16, at 940-41 (1979); Satter, Changing Roles of Courts and
Legislatures, 11 CONN. L. REV. 230, 245 (1979).
168 See generally Landis, ConstitutionalLimitations on the CongressionalPower of Investigation, 40
HARV. L. REV. 153 (1926). The author recounts situations in which legislators requested
facts to assist them in deciding upon the wisdom of proposed legislation. Id. at 177-78.
Legislatures usually are not constitutionally required to use facts in support of legislation. The Constitution views direct political representation as a sufficient check on arbitrary
excercises of legislative power. See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT, ch. 15-16
(1959). But see Choper, The Supreme Court and the PoliticalBranches: Democratic Theoy and Practice, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 810, 817 (1974) (Elections alone do not guarantee popular representativeness of Congress on every issue.). Cf.Pierce & Shapiro, Political andJudicialReview of
Ageny Action, 59 TEXAS L. REV. 1175, 1209 (1981) (Congress need not take into account all
opposing viewpoints when passing legislation.).
169 See notes 54-55 supra.
170 McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 160-61, 173-74 (1927).
171 L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 298 & n.4 (1978). Professor Landis
traced Congress' subpoena power back to 1789. Landis, supra note 168, at 169.
172 Landis, supra note 168, at 185. Currently, the penalty is codified at 2 U.S.C. § 192
(1976).
173 In Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881), the Court held that Congress could
not investigate a matter pending concurrently before a federal court because this made the
matter judicial and not legislative. Id. at 194-96. However, in Sinclair v. United States, 279
U.S. 263 (1929), the Court limited (if not implicitly overruled) Kilboun when it stated that
merely using information in pending law suits did not place the matters beyond Congress'
investigative power. Id. at 295. Congress may not, however, use its investigative power to aid
the prosecution of a particular case. Id. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note*171, at 298 (separation of powers presents limitation to Congress' investigative power).
174 See Jacobs, Extracumicular Activities of the McClellan Committee, 51 CAL. L. REV. 296
(1963) (Justice Department's use of Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the
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vestigations be conducted pursuant to the exercise of its legislative
power 175 is no barrier to investigating an array of matters ranging
from the loyalty of citizens 176 to the beginnings of life. 177 It is well

established that Congress can investigate whether or not it is contemplating new legislation or deciding whether to retain existing law. 178
Although Professor Tribe has suggested that there is no congressional
power to investigate solely in order to publicize, 179 this restriction
probably has force only when Congress assumes a defacto
prosecutorial role.180 Since one of Congress' functions is to educate
the public,' 81 broader substantive strictures placed upon its investiga82
tive power could frustrate this purpose.1
Some procedural limitations, however, operate to restrict Congress' inyestigative power. The fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination and the fourth amendment limit both the scope
and intrusiveness of congressional investigations. 8 3 In addition, due
process requires that procedures promulgated to guide the conduct of
investigations be followed. 18 4 Some procedural constraints are selfLabor or Management Field [McClellan Committee] to harass Jimmy Hoffa); F. NEWMAN &
S. SURREY, LEGISLATION 268-69 (1955) (describing use of subpoena power of Senate Committee on Un-American Activities to harrass political opponents).
175 See L. TRIBE, supra note 171, at 298.
176 Communist Infiltrationofthe Army. Pt. 3." Hearings Befrore the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 145-59 (1954) (exchange
between Senator McCarthy and General Zwicker); GRIFFITH, POLITIcs OF FEAR 214-16

(1952).
177 See, e.g., The Human Life Bill-Hearingson S. 158 Before the Subcomm. on Separation ofPowers
of the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1982) (two vols.).
178 Landis, supra note 168, at 217-18.
179 See L. TRIBE, supra note 171, at 298.
180 See note 173 supra.
181 One well-known commentator noted: "Quite as important as legislation is vigilant
oversight of adminstration; and even more important than legislation is the instruction and
guidance in political affairs which the people might receive from a body which kept all national concerns suffused in a broad daylight of discussion .... ." W. WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 297 (1901). "The informing function of Congress should be preferred
even to its legislative function." Id at 303.
182 A broader proscription might invite courts to examine frequently the legislature's motives for conducting an investigation. This spectre could chill Congress' exercise of the investigative power, and courts are reluctant to assess legislative purpose in this context. L. TRIBE,
supra note 171, at 298 (citing Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 200 (1957)). Cf. United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1968) (court reluctant to assess congressional motive
in passing statute).
183 See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 171, at 299.
184 Id. Due process also requires an investigating committee to state its formal mandate.
Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 208-15 (1957). But see A. BARTH, GOVERNMENT BY
INVESTIGATION 85 (1955) (describing Senator Eastland's "one-man" Internal Security Subcommittee) (The senator admonished witnesses' counsel, "I will decide [the ground rules] as
we go along and announce them when I desire.").
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imposed, as, from time to time, Congress passes statutes establishing
investigative procedures.

185

Because of its enormous and complex legislative task, Congress
increasingly relies upon its committees to conduct investigations.
The committee system, a structure peculiar to legislatures and not
possessed by courts, enables Congress to acquire extensive knowledge
in a myriad of areas.18 6 Repeated investigation of a particular subject area often leads a committee or subcommittee to develop substantial expertise, which may well be deferred to by the whole
Congress when considering proposed legislation. 18 7 In addition, a
public hearing conducted in committee "focuses public attention,
mobilizes interest groups for and against, and provides an occasion
for the airing of a proposal's technical justifications." 8 8
Congress' use of its accumulated expertise, and its general ability to compile detailed records, as noted above, 8 9 has undoubtedly
made it easier for the Court to sustain unprecedented legislation. For
example, detailed evidence established an indisputable link between
the state of labor relations in American industry and interstate commerce, and the Court repeatedly referred to this evidence in upholding the National Labor Relations Act in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp. 190 Similarly, in upholding provisions of the Civil Rights
185 See, e.g., note 202 infia (procedural reforms). See generally 2 U.S.C. §§ 190-198 (1982)
(procedures for congressional and committee investigations).
186 Professor Choper noted: "The committees were conceived to investigate and determine the need for legislation, study the alternatives, shape proposals for presentation to the
whole body, and make recommendations. . . the strength of many committees in determining crucial questions respecting the detail and timing of legislation has become enormous."
Choper, supra note 168, at 822-23.
187 Set R. FENNO, CONGRESSMEN IN COMMrrrEES xiii (1973) ("[S]taples of-committee
commentary hold" that committees are "repositor[ies] of legislative expertise within . . .
[their] jurisdiction[s].").
Committees perform important functions aside from accumulating expertise. For example, a committee, through its staff, may serve as a special link facilitating the flow of information and feedback concerning legislative proposals from the Hill to either the executive
branch or interest groups. Manley, CongressionalStaffand PublicPoliymaking: TheJoint Committee on InternalRevenue Taration, in CONGRESSIONAL BEHAVIOR 42, 49 (Polsby ed. 1971).
188 Polsby, StrengtheningCongress in NationalPolicymaking, in CONGRESSIONAL BEHAVIOR 3,
8 (Polsby ed. 1971).
189 See notes 19-27 supra and accompanying text.
190 301 U.S. 1 (1937). See also United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding
Fair Labor Standards Act). As noted above, the Court has not always been predisposed to
uphold legislation passed under the commerce power or to rely on congressional findings in so
doing. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). It appears from these cases
that the determination of whether congressional findings are relevant to a constitutional decision is reserved for the Court as a matter of federal law. See text accompanying note 374 infra.
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Act of 1964 under the commerce clause,19 1 the Court referred to the
voluminous record compiled by Congress establishing that racial segregation in public accommodations substantially affected interstate
commerce.1 92 The Voting Rights Act, as noted, also was supported
by evidence of racial discrimination by the states in affording some
193
persons but not others the franchise.
The fact that Congress has broad investigative power and a history replete with examples of its effective use does not guarantee that
the power will be responsibly exercised in every context, however.
For while Congress has an excellent institutional capacity to discover
and use facts, there is a primary limitation upon its ability to be
straightforward in its investigations. Congress is a political institution; its constitutional function is to be representative, not
94
objective. 1
The tool of investigation may be wielded not to provide legislators with a sound basis for selecting one legislative program over another, but rather to mollify constituents' demands that some action
191 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
192 Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. at 296-98, 299-301. In holding the Civil Rights Act
unconstitutional as applied, the trial court did not refer to Congress' fact-heavy record supporting the legislation. The district court noted, however, that no supporting facts were present in the legislation itself. 233 F. Supp. 815, 823 (N.D. Ala. 1964). It quoted at length from
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62-63 (1936), for the proposition that all a court need do
when assessing the constitutionality of legislation is to "lay the article of the constitution . ..
beside the statute and. . . decide whether the latter squares with the former." 233 F. Supp.
at 824. The trial court did not think the Act withstood this scrutiny. In reversing the trial
court, Justice Clark referred to the congressional findings several times, although he simultaneously maintained that they were not necessary to the Court's finding the Act constitutional
as applied. 379 U.S. at 299.
193 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309-15 (1966) (House and Senate
Reports frequently cited). Although it may not have been thesinequa non of the result in South
Carolina, the Court noted that many of the facts found by Congress supporting the need for
the Voting Rights Act were confirmed by judicial factfinding. Id. at 309 n.5.
194 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 502 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring). One commentator noted that "[p]olitical conciliation and accomodation characterize the legislative
• . . process..., as well as the competition for votes." Auerbach, The Reapportionment Cases:
One Person, One Vote-One Vote, One Value, 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 52. Cf. Burt, supra note 72,
at 112 (Congress "less burdened by principled restraints under which courts labor").
I am not arguing here that the Constitution always requires that Congress be objective or
impartial, although I think it does sometimes. See note 205 infra. Nor do I mean to imply in
the next few paragraphs of the text that courts are always more evenhanded in their assessments of data than Congress. Cf. note 208 infra (both institutions face constraints). What I
am establishing throughout this section is that arguments directed to institutional competence to find facts focus unduly upon a small variable relevant to determining the proper
scope of Congress' or the Court's power. Also important, for example, is identifying the institutional constraints that are placed upon each branch's abilities to gather and use facts. This
determination must be done on an ad hoc basis, depending on the subject matter in issue.
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be taken on particularly controversial issues. 95 Surveys consistently
show that members of Congress are especially sensitive to their constituents' opinions on controversial matters. 96 In order to avoid sensitive policy choices, hearings may be purposefully designed to drag
on almost interminably in the hope that "enraged" public demand
for legislative action will wane.1 97 Further, the facts found at hearings may be of no practical significance to Congress' eventual action
(or inaction). Perfunctory hearings, in which witnesses recite from
carefully drafted texts and committee members feign interest, are not
uncommon. 98 Although there are some committees that structure
their proceedings to allow conflicting viewpoints to be heard fully,
one congressional observer stated that:
The traditional format for questioning witnesses in the House
and Senate does not lend itself to opportunities for extended exchanges between members and witnesses, analysis of different
points of view, or in-depth probing of one witness's views by
another. 199
Although the author suggested that this was changing, 20 0 no evidence
suggests that it has.
In legislatures, political considerations sometimes inhibit the
construction of a full record. Many strategies exist to frustrate the
search for facts. For example, committee chairmen can "pack" their
subcommittees for or against certain legislation. 20 ' Additionally, a
chairman can determine both the precise scope of a committee's investigation and whether hearings will be held at all. He can also
selectively schedule witnesses who are expected to testify in a manner
that produces the desired record. 20 2 The structure and composition
195 C. CLAPP, THE CONGRESSMAN 265-69 (1963).
196 See Choper, supra note 168, at 836.
197 C. CLAPP, supra note 195, at 265-69. See also L. FROMAN, supra note 108, at 42.
198 W. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS 66 (1978).
199 Id. at 67.
200 Id.
201 L. FROMAN, supra note 108, at 42.
202 See Choper, supra note 168, at 824. But cf. note 205 infra (one-sided testimony in favor
of Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not make Act unconstitutional).
During periods of reform, Congress has worked to decrease the once absolute power
wielded by committee chairmen. For example, Senate procedure once allowed committee
members of the minority party to call witnesses as a matter of right. 2 U.S.C. § 190a-l(e)
(1976), repealed by, S. Res. 274, 96th Cong., Ist Sess., 125 CONG. REc. S32254-75 (Nov. 14,
1979). The repeal notwithstanding, "pro-choice" minority party members of the Senate Separation of Powers Subcommittee pressured it into calling "pro-choice" witnesses to testify
about the human life bill, S. 158. See Choper, supra note 168, at 841-43 for a list of other
attempted-and short-lived--procedural reforms.
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of specialized committees may lead to factfinding that merely ratifies
prejudices or other legislative proclivities.20 3 Even if a committee
does construct a weighty record in support of a legislative proposal,
political considerations may affect the way in which the record is
revealed to the whole Congress.2 0 4 Fairness in the compilation and
20 5
presentation of the record is not always the ultimate goal.
It is, therefore, not enough to assert generally that "Congress has
*

. .

a special ability to develop and consider the factual basis of a

problem.

' 20 6

Certainly, in the abstract, Congress has an institutional

203 One commentator recently wrote that policy in Congress is made by "staff technocrats
• . .whose knowledge of the world is limited to what they learned in school or from other
participants in the specialized Washington issue networks." M. MALBIN, UNELECTED REPRESENTATIVES 247 (1980).
204 See, e.g., Choper, supra note 168, at 823 (House Committee on Appropriations "rarely
releases its reports before the day on which debate is held .... ") (citing N. POLSBY, CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENCY 124, 146 (2d ed. 1971)). Congress as a whole does not spend a
great deal of time debating the merits of a bill. It is rare for discussion of a bill to last longer
than one day. L. FROMAN, supra note 108, at 10. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was debated
for nine days. Id.
205 Of course, Congress need not be "fair" for its work product to be held constitutional
by the Court. For example, Congress' use of the commerce power in the Civil Rights Act of
1964 was ratified despite the fact that, aside from testimony and data collected to support the
proposition that racial discrimination adversely affected interstate commerce, little information was compiled concerning the negative effect desegregation might have on commerce.
Under the commerce clause, such selectivity of congressional investigation is immaterial to
any question of the resultant legislation's constitutionality. This is because congressional legislation need not facilitate commercial intercourse. Congress may properly pass laws that
cause commercial relations to cease altogether. See, e.g., Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321
(1903) (Harlan, J.); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917). Cf.In re Rahrer, 140
U.S. 545 (1891) (state legislation authorized by Congress); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin,
328 U.S. 408 (1946) (same).
Congress does not have the flexibility stemming from selective investigations under other
constitutional grants of power. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651 n.10 (Congress,
under 14th amendment, may only legislate to enforce, not to "restrict, abrogate, or dilute,"
the guarantees of equal protection and due process). One commentator argued that the different amounts of legislative flexibility allowed under the commerce and enforcement power
derived from the language of the constitutional mandates: "regulate" and "enforce" respectively. Note, CongressionalPower to Enforce Due Process Rights, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1265, 1275
n.54 (1980). Cf. notes 107-08 supra (discussing relativity of constitutional terms).
The point here is that, because of the need to be more straightforward in investigations
conducted pursuant to passage of enforcement legislation, judicial deference to congressional
factfinding under the 14th amendment should not be as great as it is when the facts are found
under the commerce power. This point is not addressed by proponents of the "human life"
bill. Galebach, for example, relying on the commerce cases, states that the "human life"
legislation would be constitutional regardless of the strength (or presumably the source) of its
supporting facts. Galebach, supra note 12, at 8. In this context, consider the different variations, strengths, and weaknesses of legislative fact listed at note 16 supra.
206 Monaghan, Foreword" ConstitutionalCommon Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 28 (1975) (citing Oregon v.Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 247-48 (opinion of Brennan, J.)); Cox, supra note 12, at 22829.

[Vol. 59:3371

POLITICS V. THE CLOISTER

capacity to find facts. But in some situations, it also has institutional
incentives to ignore or distort them. Nor does the platitude of Congress' institutional competence argue that the legislature is better
able than the courts to find facts in any particular case. More information is required to complete the analysis: Who are the personalities involved? What political constraints attend the issue? What is
the effect of public opinion? The factfinding theory, while praising
Congress' investigative apparatus, addresses neither these specific
questions nor the impact their answers might have upon the nature
of the facts found and used by Congress in a particular context.
B.

Facts in Courts

As this section demonstrates, courts, like legislatures, possess significant ability to find and evaluate facts through their regularized
procedures. Because courts2 07-relative to legislatures-are sheltered
from politics, 20 8 their factfinding ability in a particular case may exceed that of the political branch.
Several theories discuss the essentials of proper judicial decisionmaking. The realist view, for example, supports an instrumental approach to constitutional adjudication; it encourages results that
work-"presumably at a reasonable social cost. '209 Such utilitarian
determinations must be based upon facts surrounding the
2 10
controversy.
Professor Wechsler took a more general, less ad hoc, approach.
207 This argument refers specifically to federal constitutional courts, whose judges are protected from political overbearance by the strictures of article III. Professor Wellington, for
example, wrote that the Supreme Court "is not directly responsible to the people; Justices are
not elected. The Court is designed to be unresponsive to the pressure and play of interest
group politics; Justices are insulated from such pressures." Wellington, Common Law Rules and
ConstitutionalDouble Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 266 (1973). Although article III courts may be subject to some indirect political pressures, see Choper, supra
note 168, at 849-54, they are clearly less politically accountable than Congress. Id. at 848.
208 Realists may bristle at this proposition, although such reaction is unwarranted. I am
not arguing here that courts, unlike Congress, enjoy complete immunity from political pressures and result orientations. However, as note 207 supra and many commentators suggest,
there is at least a qualitative difference between the types of pressures weighing upon each
branch. The truth of this proposition depends in part upon whether a broad or narrow definition of "politics" is used. I am using a narrow definition, one that recognizes that electoral
pressures have an effect upon resulting policy. Article IIIjudges not subject to election do not
work under this pressure, although they may be subject to other external constraints. See
Tushnet, supra note 32, at 808 (justices constrained by the norm of "compromise and cooperation"); Greenawalt, The Enduring Signifcance of Neutral Pincples, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 982,
1007-08 (1978) (Court faces institutional pressure to produce majority opinions).
209 Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusiona , Rule, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1027, 1030 (1974).
210 LindeJudges,Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227, 228 (1972).
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He argued that in order for judicial review to be an intellectually
persuasive doctrine, courts must strive to base decisions upon "neutral principles."'2 11 A principled decision "rests on reasons with respect to all the issues in the case, reasons that in their generality and
22 2
their neutrality transcend any immediate result that is involved." '
Distinct from the realist view, Professor Wechsler's position was that
the development of doctrine by the courts must be different in kind
from the ad hoc, instrumental use to which principles are put by
political institutions, which "trim and shape their speech and votes
[according to] sentiment at any given time.

'21 3

It is telling that neither the realist nor the neutral principles theory has achieved unqualified acceptance by the Court.2 1 4 Perhaps
this is because the theories are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Indeed, like the search for a pragmatic result, the search for neutral
principles allows judges to use facts when deciding specific controversies.21 5 The delicate examination and balancing of competing interests required by constitutional adjudication cannot be based solely
211 Wechsler, TowardNeutral Pinciplesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1959). I
am not unaware of some legal scholars' attempts to discredit this notion. See, e.g., Tushnet,
supra note 32, at 804-24. However, it is significant that at least one contemporary scholar who
advocates a modern approach to judicial analysis does not reject the need for principled judicial decisionmaking. See M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 25 (1982) (recognizing importance, in a democracy, of framing judicial decisions
within principles). This supports the later statement, see text accompanying note 214 infra,
that realism and neutral principles theories are not mutually exclusive.
212

Wechsler, supra note 211, at 19.

213

Id. at 14-15.

214 The Court recently acknowledged its departure from a previously settled principle,
and apologized "to all" for the infraction. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983) (regretting
asking for additional briefs and argument on issue not previously ruled upon by state court).
Additionally, dissenting justices do not hesitate to excoriate objectionable decisions of the
Court as departing from supposedly settled or otherwise "neutral" principles. See, e.g., City of
Akron v. Akron Ctr. For Reproductive Health, 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (criticizing Court's departure from "sound constitutional theory [and] our need to decide
cases based on the application of neutral princples'); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777
(1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (Court's equal protection decisions characterized as "endless tinkering with legislative judgments").
Dissenters also object to the Court's ignoring the realities surrounding a particular ruling. See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 483 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Court shows
"a distressing insensitivity to the plight of impoverished pregnant women"). Cf. National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 867 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (decision striking
down federal labor regulations applied to states termed an "ill-conceived abstraction").
215 See Karst, Legislative Facts in ConstitutionalLitigation, in 1960 Sup. CT. REv. 75, 111
("[A] a court will do a better job of deciding if it has been adequately informed as to the
factual links between the challenged governmental action and the neutral principles involved.'). Cf. Wechsler, supra note 211, at 23 (attributing demise of pre-1937 commerce
clause doctrine in part to "simple facts of life").
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"on logical deduction from abstract legal principles," 2 16 even if it is
based in part upon such deduction. 21 7 In modern times, when courts
routinely decide matters having broad impact upon the entire nation, 2 18 facts must be collected, marshalled, and presented in an effective manner to insure that judges have an accurate picture of the
society upon which they impose rules of law.21 9 One criticism of the

now-discredited decisions of the economic substantive due process
era, 220 for example, was that the Court improperly refused to use
facts presented by the litigants in support of state and national economic legislation.22 1 Whatever theory of judicial decisionmaking one
relies upon, facts are necessary to provide the judge with a concrete
basis for making a decision; they educate the judge as to the probable
222
effects of a particular outcome.
Throughout the course of litigation, therefore, facts flow into
courts through many channels. Just as legislatures rely on interest
groups and individual witnesses to testify before investigative committees, 22 3 courts depend on litigants (including intervenors 224) to
216 Brown, Due Process ofLaw, Police Power,and the Supreme Court, 40 HARV.L. REv. 943,
967 (1927).
217 Cf. M. PERRY, supra note 211, at 25 (use of principle necessary to legitimize Court
decisions).
218 See Karst, supra note 215, at 109, 111.
219 See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. For Reproductive Health, 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983)
(Court examining medical data to determine whether city's abortion ordinance relates to
maternal health). See also United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 460 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) ("It is perfectly proper for judges to disagree about what the Constitution requires.
But it is disgraceful for an interpretation of the Constitution to be premised upon unfounded
assumptions about how people live.").
220 See generaly J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 436-52 (2d
ed. 1983). A detailed analysis of the interaction between the New York legislature and court
of appeals during this period can be found in Lindgren, Byond Cases: ReconsideringJudicial
Review, 1983 Wisc. L. REv. 583, 593-635. The author points out that as due process doctrine
developed into a justification for judicial evaluation of the factual bases of statutes, laws previously held unconstitutional were "reinforced and repassed after additional factual inquiry."
Id. at 612 (footnote omitted).
221 Professor Tribe reported that many justices of the Lochner era saw data as "manipulable and thus unreliable." L. TRIBE, note 171,supra at 436. "For example, when ChiefJustice
White was confronted with a Brandeis brief in Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917), he
reportedly responded 'I could compile a brief twice as thick to prove that the legal profession
ought to be abolished.'" Id. at 436 n.3 (citing L. PFEFFER, THIS HONORABLE COURT 259
(1965)). See also Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 559-60 (1923) (facts found "interesting but only mildly persuasive.'). Cf.Karst, supra note 215, at 105 (experts' grinding "professional axes" implies unreliable testimony).
222 Karst, supra note 215, at 81. But see Hazard, The Supreme Court as a Legislature, 64
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 12 (1978) (The Court should not focus solely on "facts before it" when
determining consequences of constitutional decision as those facts are merely "a prologue.").
223 See notes 171-88 supra and accompanying text.
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225
provide them with the facts needed for responsible decisions.
The judicial branch does not lack regularized factfinding procedures. Pretrial discovery in federal civil cases 226 allows the parties to
gain knowledge of evidence which their opponents possess and permits litigants to use the evidence in their adversary's possession. The
broad discovery rules were specifically designed to insure that "civil
trials in the federal courts no longer [would] be carried on in the
dark. '22 7 This full disclosure policy generates pressure on the parties
to produce complete factual records. Once the records are assem-

bled, then, courts "seem. . .reasonably well equipped to undertake
competent assessments" of even the most complex data. 228

Soliciting the testimony of witnesses is a crucial way of presenting facts to courts. For example, expert testimony can be used to
educate judges in the same way it is used to educate legislators. Although the factfinder may decide that the expert's testimony is not
highly probative,2 29 the parties can present the evidence in court subject to applicable rules. 230 Importantly, exclusionary rules of evidence have less application when experts testify,2 3 1 thus allowing

education to proceed relatively unhindered by formality.
Cross-examination is another well-known tool used in American
224 Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for intervention by parties
not originally involved in the litigation.
225 M. REBELL & A. BLOCK, EDUCATIONAL POLICYMAKING AND THE COURTS 207
(1982).
226 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) describes the breadth of federal discovery:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant
to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim
or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other
party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location
of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of
persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection
that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information
sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence.
The Supreme Court has stated that the discovery rules, FED. R. CIv. P. 26-37, must be
broadly and liberally construed. Hickman v.Taylor, 329 U.S.495, 507 (1947). This insures
that parties will narrow the number of contested factual questions and present relevant evidence to the court. See, e.g., Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 72 F.R.D. 116, 120-21
(S.D. Ohio 1976) (liberal discovery sanctioned in "complex civil rights" case). See also M.
REBELL & A. BLOCK, supra note 225, at 44-46.
227 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. at 501. See also Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104,
114-15, 121 (1964) (broad scope of rules, except where express limitations present).
228 M. REBELL & A. BLOCK, supra note 225, at 48 (social science data).
229 See Cox, supra note 12, at 209 (assertion that expert witnesses are "seldom more than
special pleaders").
230 See FED. R. EVID. 702-706 (use and permissible scope of expert testimony).
231 Karst, supra note 215, at 103.
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courts to ferret out facts. Cross-examination is constitutionally required in many civil and all criminal cases. 23 2 This procedure is so
important that the decision whether or not to present testimony at all
may be based in part upon the costs and benefits of cross233
examination.
Cross-examination serves both to call into question the credibility of testimony, and to elicit additional facts that are related to those
brought out on direct or (if not so related) are necessary to place
other issues in proper perspective. 234 The Supreme Court stated that
cross-examination is an important way to "expos[e] falsehood and
[bring] . . .out the truth.

' 235

The nature of the facts to be proved

does not diminish its value as a truth-determining mechanism. For
example, cross-examination is useful in examining an expert's testimony, notwithstanding the fact that the testimony might "rest...
on a chain of debatable inferences based on standards of the expert's
own selection. '236 Even if a witness is not successfully impeached by
cross-examination, it remains an effective truth-screening device for
his testimony. Finally, the scope of cross-examination is necessarily
broad. Although Federal Rule of Evidence 611 (b) limits the scope of
cross-examination to "the subject matter of the direct examination
and matters affecting the credibility of the witness," the rule goes on
to allow the court, in its discretion, to "permit inquiry into additional
matters as if on direct examination. '237 Unfortunately, cross-examination is usually unavailable in congressional hearings. 238
In appellate litigation, briefs filed by litigants 239 and amicus cu240
riae serve an indispensible educative function. The Brandeis brief,
in which the attorney blends extensive factual material and traditional legal research relevant to the resolution of difficult policy questions, has long been used to persuade judges, albeit with varying
232 See, e.g., Green v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959) (security clearance procedure); Smith
v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1968) (criminal case).
233 Karst, supra note 215, at 101.
234 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 16, § 29 (2d ed. 1972).
235 Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. at 131 (citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965)).
236 Karst, supra note 215, at 102.
237 FED. R. EVID. 611 (b).
238 Generally, cross-examination is not permitted or even thought to be appropriate at
legislative hearings. It may, however, be available because of particular committee rules or
types of investigation undertaken. While it has been asserted that legislators' questions frequently serve to "represent the contesting interests," no right to cross-examine witnesses usually exists in legislative hearings. Karst, supra note 215, at 101 n.97.
239 See FED. R. App. P. 28.
240 Id Rule 29.
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degrees of success. 24 1 The assumption underlying the factual brief is
that judges, although able to interpret the law, cannot put their decisions into proper factual perspective until they have been properly
educated. 242 But given that this educating is going on in modern
an inability to
courtrooms, it does not follow that courts suffer from
243
legislatures.
to
relative
facts
evaluate
and
discover
Lawyers' briefs do not come only from the litigants. Appellate
241 Compare Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (New York law limiting the hours
employees are permitted to work in bakeries is an unreasonable interference with the right of
the individual to contract) with Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (regulation of hours
women may work is within state's police power and is a proper restriction on the individual's
right to contract). Although the fact-heavy brief was conceived during the Lochner era, it met
with only partial success. Compare Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917) (upholding state
minimum hours law for factory workers) with Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923)
(state minimum wage law for women held unconstitutional).
Contemporary commentators are enthusiastic, however, about the modern use of the
Brandeis brief to educate appellate judges by supplementing the trial record and placing it in
a larger factual perspective. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 12, at 209 ("Brandeis brief is a useful
tool for opening judges' minds to the facts found and conclusions drawn by all kinds of investigators."). Accord, Karst, supra note 215, at 100 (use of Brandeis brief to provide factual
support for the presumption of constitutionality "enjoyed considerable success and
popularity").
242 See generally Bikl ,JudicialDeterminationof Questionsof Fact Afecting the ConstitutionalValidityofLegislative Action, 38 HARV. L. REv. 6 (1924). Professor Cox carried this argument to an
unjustified extreme, however, when he asserted that "the greater number of [legislators] and
their varied backgrounds and experience make it virtually certain that the typical legislature
will command wider knowledge and keener appreciation of current social and economic conditions than will the typical court." Cox, supra note 12, at 209. Especially as applied to
Congress, a majority of whose members are lawyers, the proposition is unfounded that courts
are "typically" less heterogeneous than legislatures. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:
A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 57 (1980) ("Judges tend to be drawn from roughly the same
ranks as legislators.", quoted in M. PERRY, supra note 211, at 116). Judges, like legislators,
come from a variety of backgrounds. For a popular description of the diverse backgrounds
and ideologies of the present justices of the Supreme Court (with the exception of Justice
O'Connor), see B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN (1979). There is no reason to assume that courts are, in their membership, any more monolithic than legislatures.
Even if this were true, however, it does not follow that judges are less willing or able to learn
new things than are legislators. Cf. Hazard, supra note 222, at 20-21 (justices typically have
had much experience in law, politics, and government.).
243 Cf. Karst,supra note 215, at 106 (danger that "the interests which get left out because
they are not represented by judicial lobbies are likely to be the same ones which are denied
consideration in legislative halls"). This danger is probably less acute now than when Professor Karst wrote in 1960, given the subsequent emergence of the public interest litigation
movement and the class action device. See M. REBELL & A. BLOCK, supra note 225, (much
"social" litigation brought by public interest bar).
The class action device, FED. R. Civ. P. 23, not only enhances judicial recognition of
interests previously thought to be inconsequential, but decreases differences between the types
of facts found by courts and legislatures-traditionally expressed by calling the former "adjudicative" and the latter "legislative." See, e.g., United States v. Gould, 536 F.2d 216, 220 (8th
Cir. 1976) (adjudicative facts "developed in a particular case"; legislative facts "do not
change from case to case but apply universally'). Today, courts need records containing facts
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courts accept briefs filed by amicus curiae who present additional
facts from a perspective different from that of the parties, or who
highlight important issues tangential to the litigation. The Supreme
Court occasionally recognizes the need for "outside aid" 244 and requests submission of amicus briefs as it did, for example, in South Carolina.245 In a sense, the statements of fact, law, and policy in amicus

246
briefs serve a function analogous to that of lobbyists in legislatures. .
Although there are other devices used by courts to find and evaluate facts,24 7 plenary examination of them is not warranted here because the conclusion is well supported that courts, like legislatures,
have several well-defined and often-used methods for constructing
and using fact-heavy records. It seems clear that both legislative and
judicial factfinding procedures have their own strengths and weaknesses, their own biases and distortions, and their own special incen'248
tives for discovering "truth.

While the political process may produce one result 24 9 and the

arguments of courtroom adversaries another, proponents of the
factfinding theory misleadingly interpret this to mean that courts are
inherently or institutionally less able than legislatures to find and use
facts. Consider, however, Professor Wellington's statement:
broadly applicable, i.e., those applicable to more than the immediate controversy between the
parties before the court. See generally M. REBELL & A. BLOcK, supra note 225.
244 Karst, supra note 215, at 106.
245 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 307 (Court invited amicus briefs from all
fifty states). Cf. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 664 (1966) (Solicitor General Marshall argued for United States as amicus curiae by special leave of Court).
Recently, in an interesting twist of amicus curiae procedure, the Court appointed a
prominent attorney (former Secretary of Transportation William Coleman) to argue a tax
case in which the Justice Department had withdrawn its support for the Internal Revenue
Service and adopted petitioners' cause. See Court Bars 2 Schools' Tar Break, Wash. Post, May
25, 1983 at Al, 9, col. 1. Mr. Coleman argued for the government's previously held position,
which prevailed in Court in an 8-1 decision. See Bob Jones University v. United States, 103 S.
Ct. 2017 (1983).
246 Karst, supra note 215, at 106. See M. REBELL & A. BLOCK, supra note 225, at 207.
247 At the trial level, facts can be found by special masters appointed by the court pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 53, or by magistrates under the Federal Magistrates Act, Pub. L. No.
90-578, 82 Stat. 1108 (1968), as amended, Pub. L. No. 92-239, 86 Stat. 47 (1972), (codified at
28 U.S.C. § 631-36 (1976 & Supp V 1982)). See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667
(1980) (holding Federal Magistrates Act constitutional).
Trial courts may also appoint special assistants to help decipher complex technical data.
See, e.g., United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953),
af'd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (antitrust case; economist appointed by trial judge). One appellate
judge publicly called for the permanent availability of a scientific expert who could "advise a
court so that it could better understand the record." Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmkaing,
and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 509, 550 (1974).
248 See generaly M. REBELL & A. BLOCK, supra note 225, at 11-14.
249 Seegenerally L. FROMAN,supra note 108, at 16-33.
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While there can be no question that the fact-finding facilities
available to legislatures through committee hearings and investigations are frequently helpful and are facilities that a court cannot command, this advantage is less than meets the eye. On
many issues more than enough factual information is generated
and for every expert
without hearings; legislative facts abound
250
there is his equal and opposite member.
Why, in light of comments such as this, does the notion that legislatures are somehow inherently better able than courts to "see, hear,
and investigate actual conditions ' '251 stubbornly persist, especially in
the form of the factfinding theory with its drastic ramifications concerning the relative powers of Congress and the courts? The
Supreme Court recently referred to the asserted institutional superiority of legislatures to find facts as a partial rationale for upholding
both federal 252 and state253 legislation, even though nothing suggested that the legislatures' investigative apparatus was, in each particular instance, better suited to compile and correctly analyze facts
than the adjudicative (trial and appellate) process.
The stakes must be greater than institutional capacity to find
facts. The issue, rhetorically cast in terms of facts and factfinding
competence, is really whether a political majority or the Supreme
2 54
Court should have the last word in establishing a particular policy.
Arguments like those presented in the factfinding theory serve to
250 Wellington, supra note 207, at 240.
251 Note, The Presentationof Facts Underlying the Constitutionalioof Statutes, 49 HARV. L. REV.
631, 633 (1936).
252 See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. at 465-67 (1980) (legislative facts supporting
minority set-aside program for construction industry).
253 See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 102 S. Ct. 3348, 3355 (1982) (legislative facts documenting harm to children who participate in erotic films); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 459 & n.5 (1981) (legislative facts supporting state law banning sale of
milk in nonreturnable plastic containers). Cf City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. For Reproductive
Health, 103 S. Ct. 2506-07 n.4 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (Legislatures' "superior factfinding capabilities" make them better than courts to determine medical context of abortion
regulation.).
254 Consider Professor Cox, who wrote immediately after Katzenbach v. Morgan was
decided:
Congressional supremacy over the judiciary in the areas of legislative factfinding
and evaluation and over the state legislatures under the supremacy clause in any
area within federal power, would seem to be a wiser touchstone, more consonant with
the predominant themes of our constitutional histoiy, than judically-defined areas of primary and secondary state and federal competence.
Cox, supra note 71, at 107 (emphasis added). Professor Cox's interest in congressional superiority probably stemmed from the Court's being an anti-majoritarian institution and from his
perception that each state legislature represents but a small fraction of the national community. See Cox, supra note 12, at 210. Cf Burt, supra note 72, at 109-10 (recognizing that
different constituencies of national and state legislatures produce different perceptions of
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mask their proponents' value preference that Congress have the primary if not sole responsibility for formulating national policy under
the post-Civil War amendments.
In support of this conclusion, the next section identifies some
value judgments implicit in labeling a matter one of "fact." The
next section, unlike the one just completed, does not presume that
the terms "law" and "fact" have a static definition or content. It
turns away from studying institutional capacity to find and use facts,
and instead questions what the terms "law" and "fact" actually denote. To illustrate the omnipresence of value undercurrents, historical and contemporary definitions of "law" and "fact" are examined
in three legal contexts: economic legislation, administrative practice,
and habeas corpus. After examining these areas of the law, the section concludes that definitions of law and fact are elastic. Whether a
question properly comes within the rubric of "law" or "fact" depends
less upon what "facts" philosophically may be than upon a policy
determination of which branch should have the final say. Labeling a
matter "factual," therefore, is more a conclusion than a characterization. Defining a finding as one of "fact" conveys less about its intrinsic nature (i.e., is it a "fact"?) than it does a conclusion about the
proper institution for deciding the underlying policy issues. For example, is the question of when human life begins one of "fact,"
thereby allowing Congress to legislate under the fourteenth amendment pursuant to its finding? Or are the limits of Congress' authority to curtail the right to privacy, as applied in Roe v. Wade, 255 a
question of law? Arising thus in the human life context, the factfinding theory, as used by Galebach and Senator Helms, seems to serve
as a screen for their value-based conclusion that abortion policy
should once again be set through the legislative process.
III.

Making Laws and Finding Facts

Although scholars acknowledge the difficulty of articulating
256
clear and precise distinctions between questions of law and fact,
the task is important because the characterization often dictates
which branch of government will be charged with a question's resolution.2 5 7 Marbugy v. Madison2 58 classically stated that "[iut is emphatifacts). Both these considerations, although they may be valid, have nothing to do with institutional capacity to find facts.
255 410 U.S. 113 (1973) "[The] right of privacy . . . is broad enough to encompass a
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." Id 153.
256 See, .g., the sources cited in Note, supra note 205, at 1271 n.39.
257 Judge Friendly stated that "perhaps about the only satisfactory criterion for distin-
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cally the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is. ' ' 259 The factfinding theory, in turn, is based upon Con260
gress' alleged superiority over the courts in finding and using facts.

Marbugy's barest interpretation holds that deciding the constitutionality of statutes is a question of law reserved for the Supreme
Court. 26 1 On the other hand, the function most clearly reserved for

the finder of fact is ascertaining the existence of or measuring tangible phenomena. Facts are thought of as empirical, 262 evidentiary,
and as capable of being determined with a degree of detached certainty (e.g., who is the murder weapon currently registered to?).
guishing 'law' from 'fact' " is ascertaining "what a court can determine better than a jury."
United States v. J.B. Williams Co., 498 F.2d 414, 431 (2d Cir. 1974).
258 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
259 Id at 177. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (federal judiciary "supreme in
the exposition of the law of the Constitution').
260 See, e.g., note 97 supra and accompanying text. The notion that legislatures are superior to courts at "finding facts" is not new. See Note, The Presentation of Facts Underlying the
Constitutionality oStatutes, 49 HARV. L. REV. 631, 633 (1936). Cf Nebbia v. New York, 291
U.S. 502 (1934) (legislative investigation disclosed destructive competition in milk industry.).
261 Professor Cox, for example, did not contend that the Supreme Court should abdicate
its responsibility to decide the constitutionality of statutes passed by Congress. See Cox, supra
note 12, at 253 (Court should carefully scrutinize congressional legislation); Cox, Congress v.
The Supreme Court, 33 MERCER L. REV. at 701, 711 (1982). Rather, he argued that the
Court's level of review should be very deferential when the challenged legislation was supported by facts and enhanced individual rights. Cox, supra note 12, at 252. This rationale
was adopted by a plurality of justices in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 240, 248 (1970)
(opinion of Brennan, White & Marshall, JJ.).
262 A discussion of whether something can ever justifiably be labeled "empirical" is beyond the scope of this article. I assume here that certain phenomena are measured or otherwise ascertained "empirically" because society has reached a consensus regarding how they
should be measured or otherwise thought about. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S.Ct. at 1058
(data relating to job performance of older workers referred to as "empirical evidence"). Cf
Tushnet, supra note 32, at 807 ("Legitimate actions are those that are accepted by the relevant public.").
Defining "empirical" in this way will be unsatisfying for some, perhaps for two reasons.
First, consensuses change with the passage of time and the acquisition of new knowledge.
Empiricism based upon such shifting sands looks very subjective. See, e.g., Cook, "Facts"and
"Statements of Fact," 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 233, 239 (1936-37) (describing evolution of scientific
methods used in chemistry to weigh elements).
Secondly, a claim of empiricism requiring a social consensus does not properly recognize
the instances in which the Court itself may prevent such a consensus from ever forming.
When the Court invalidates the government's exercise of power to legislate in a particular
area, the factfinding underpinning the legislation may be discouraged and thus effectively
prevented. Cf Lindgren, supra note 220, at 626 ("When the courts declared . . .statutes
[restricting entry into occupations] unconstitutional, they destroyed the factual assumptions
on which the legislature's initial choice had been made."). For example, when Roe v. Wade
held that the states were prevented from adopting "one theory of life", 410 U.S. at 162, it
provided a practical disincentive for the states to ever again consider the question of when
human life begins. Why investigate if no legislation can result? See also City of Akron v.
Akron Ctr. For Reproductive Health, 103 S.Ct. 2489 & n.5 (striking down ordinance requir-
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Facts are distinguished from opinions or value preferences. 263 Facts
can be historical; 264 that is, they may detail prior occurrences (e.g.,
did X shoot Y on the night in question?), utterances (e.g., did X warn
Y prior to the shots?), or intents 265 (e.g., did X shoot Y with malice
aforethought?). Justice Frankfurter discussed "fact" in the sense of a
"recital of external events and the credibility of their narrators. '266
This comports with traditional and commonsense understanding of
the term.
Under a commonsense analysis, it would seem simple to determine whether something is a question of law or a question of fact.
However, an examination of three different areas of the law reveals
ing physician to inform woman seeking abortion that fetus is "human life from the moment of
conception").
The problem with my definition of empiricism in this context is that it allows the Court
(or others) to bootstrap a fact-based (or rather, lack-of-fact-based) rationale for invalidating
legislation. Although the Roe v. Wade Court pointed out that there was no consensus on
when human life begins, 410 U.S. at 159, the judicial preemption resulting from the case
helped to preclude society (or at least state legislatures) from ever reaching a consensus on the
matter. Whether an "empirical" case (in the sense used here) could have been made at the
state level as to when human life begins (and whether such a consensus would have altered
the result in Roe v. Wade) is now, partly because of the Court, conjectural. In Roe v. Wade,
the Court itself helped to insure the very subjectivity-that there was no consensus on when
human life begins-it fingered in its analysis. Therefore, it seems improperly simple for contemporary Roe v. Wade supporters to criticize facts offered, in support of abortion restrictions
today as biased or subjective. (Interestingly, similar claims of bias also permeated the economic substantive due process era, see note 220 supra, when the Court also precluded governmental action in certain areas. See note 221 supra. See also Lindgren, supra note 220, at 62630).
Despite these problems, I believe that my definition of "empirical" is sufficient to illustrate the essence of what we usually think of as "fact." (It should be noted that the constitutionality of the "human life" bill, based upon congressional factfinding, is not foreclosed by
the Roe v. Wade holding because Roe v. Wade does not answer the question of whether
Congress under the enforcement power--as compared with the states under their police
power-can adopt one theory of life.)
263 See Professor Cox's description of the difference between questions of fact and degree:
If Congress enacts a law regulating the amount of wheat a farmer may grow on his
home farm to feed his own pigs, the first question is purely factual-what is infact
the relation between the volume of wheat grown for home consumption and the
national movement of commodities? The next question is one of degree-is that
practical relation close enough to interstate commerce to justify federal regulation?
Cox, supra note 12, at 225 (emphasis in original) (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942).
264 See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 506 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.) ("the external
events that occurred'). Cf M. RESELL & A. BLOCK, supra note 225, at 12 (describing differences between "historical" and "social" facts). But see Tushnet, supra note 32, at 800 (asserting that "[t]he past . . .is in its essence indeterminate').
265 See, e.g., Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 102 S. Ct. 1781, 1790 (1982) (discriminatory intent a question of fact).
266 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. at 506 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
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that definitions of law and fact are slippery. Historically, the definitions have both excluded empirical determinations and included
opinions and value judgments, depending upon policy-laden evaluations of a particular institution's proper functions. The following discussion surveys national economic legislation under the commerce
clause, administrative practice, and habeas corpus, to highlight the
policy issues underlying the shifting allocations of power in these areas, which have been justified in part by strategic uses of the terms
law and fact. The conclusion to be drawn is that one cannot usefully
label a matter one of law or fact until these types of policy issues are
acknowledged, sorted out, and balanced.
A. Economic Legislation
In the early commerce clause cases, congressional findings were
occasionally set forth in the economic legislation under review to establish a nexus between the matter being regulated and its relation
to or impact upon interstate commerce. 267 Although the Supreme
Court sometimes took note of these findings, their presence did not
compel judicial ratification of the legislation. 268 The findings'
nondispositive character stemmed from the Court's refusal to allow
Congress to make a binding assertion that, as a matter of fact, an
269
activity being regulated had an impact on interstate commerce.
There was in every case a de novo judicial determination of the
question.
Such was the situation when the Supreme Court first reviewed
the antitrust legislation. In 1890, Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act. 2 70 The Act's legislative history documented Congress'
careful consideration of both the impact of monopolization on the
national economy and the proper reach of congressional power under
the commerce clause (and, impliedly, the intended scope of the statute)-2 71 In United States v. E. C Knight Co. ,272 however, the Supreme
267 See, e.g., Chicago Bd. of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 4-5, (1923) (In § 3 of the Grain
Futures Act of 1922 "Congress has expressly declared that transactions and prices of grain in
dealing in futures are susceptible to speculation, manipulation and control which are detrimental to the producer and consumer and persons handling grain in interstate commerce.").
268 See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 289-91 (1936).
269 See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. at 38 (implying that the question of
whether manipulation of grain market is detrimental to public is different from asking
whether such manipulation is "too remote in its effect on interstate commerce.").
270 Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-7 (West Supp. 1983)).

271. See generally, A.

WALKER, HISTORY OF THE SHERMAN LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

1-46 (1910) (including discussion among Senators regarding whether Congress
could regulate manufacturing under the commerce clause).
OF AMERICA
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Court ignored the legislative history and considered de novo whether
the acquisition of "nearly complete control of the manufacture of
refined sugar within the United States" 2 73 could properly be prevented by an act of Congress. The Court reserved for itself as a matter of law the question whether the manufacturing process was a part
of or sufficiently related to interstate commerce. It held, without reference to any congressional findings, that
Commerce succeeds to manufacture, and is not a part of it. The
power to regulate commerce

. .

is a power independent of the

power to suppress monopoly. But it may operate in repression of
monopoly whenever that comes within the rules by which commerce is governed2 74or whenever the transaction is itself a monopoly of commerce.
The Court did not indicate when such a situation might exist.
During this era, the linchpin of the Court's doctrine was its determination of whether the regulated activity "directly" or "indirectly" affected interstate commerce.2 75 The question was reserved to
the Court as a matter of law, 27 6 and was often resolved without regard to congressional findings on the point.2 7 7 The direct/indirect
affect test rested upon history (including the common law) 278 and

rigid platitude, 279 rather than empiricism.
272 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
273 Id at 9.
274 Id at 12.
275 Seeid at 12, 17. Justice Douglas traced the genesis of the test to the Shreveport case. W.
DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 1939-1975: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS,
164 (1980); see note 77 .supra (discussing Shreveport).
276 See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. at 290 (congressional declaration in Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 that production and distribution of coal "directly affect[s] interstate commerce" merely "opinion" of the legislature).
277 The Carter Court stated:
Whether the effect of a given activity or condition is direct or indirect is not always
easy to determine. . . . The distinction . . . turns, not upon the magnitude of

either the cause or the effect, but entirely upon the manner in which the effect has
been brought about.. . . It is quite true that rules of law are sometimes qualified
by considerations of degree. . . . But the matter of degree has no bearing upon the
question here. ...
Id at 307-08.
278 See, e.g., id at 308-09 (common law).
279 See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. at 13 (It is better to suffer from
"acknowledged evils" than risk "more serious consequences by resort to expedients of even
doubtful constitutionality.").
Because of its reliance upon bromides rather than analyses based upon congressional
findings, the Supreme Court's early commerce decisions are difficult to reconcile. In Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899), for example, the Court held that
the Sherman Act could constitutionally be applied to defendant suppliers of pipe who con-

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[1984]

Judicial notice 28 0 of both the deepening depression and deteriorating labor-management relations in critical industries probably
contributed to the Court's abandonment in 1937 of its wooden application of the direct/indirect affect test. In that year the Court decided, in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,28I that the propriety of

national economic legislation "is necessarily [a question] of degree. '2 82 The Court continued:
Whatever amounts to more or less constant practice, and threatens to obstruct or unduly to burden the freedom of interstate
commerce is within the regulatory power of Congress under the
commerce clause and it is primaril.yfor Congress to considerand decide
thefact of the danger and meet it.283

This theoretical framework thus justified the Court's delegation to
Congress, as a question of fact or degree, the duty to decide whether
industrial strife presented a sufficient nexus with interstate commerce
to justify the exercise of power embodied in the National Labor Relations Act.2 84 The detailed congressional findings set forth in section
one of the Act 28 5 became immediately relevant to the Court, as did
previous legislative investigations concerning the causes and effects of
labor unrest. 28 6 Rejecting dogma, the Court observed: "We have
often said that interstate commerce itself is a practical conception. It
is equally true that interferences with that commerce must be ap287
praised by a judgment that does not ignore actual experience."
88
2
The statute, as applied, was upheld.
InJones & Laughlin, the Court was not persuaded to change the
definition of interstate commerce, which still connoted movement of
goods interstate. Rather, it decided that Congress must be free to
spired to arrange for noncompetitive bidding and allocation of sales territory. Id at 213. The
Court saw this particular elimination of competition as a direct restraint on interstate trade in
iron pipe. Id at 238, 243. Why such a conspiracy was distinguished from the monopoly in
E.C Knight is not apparent from the Court's analysis, although Justice Peckham admitted
"[tihe power of Congress over this subject seems to us much more important and necessary
than the liberty of the citizen to enter into contracts of the nature above mentioned." Id at
230. Perhaps the Court appreciated that a contrary decision, when coupled with E.G. Knight,
would have effectively eliminated the Sherman Act as a tool of trade regulation.
280 See note 79 supra (text of FED. R. EvID. 201).
281 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
282 Id at 37.
283 Id (quoting Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922)) (emphasis added).
284 49 Stat. 449 (current version at 29 U.S.C.A. § 151) (West 1973).
285 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 23 n.2.
286 See id at 41-43 & nn.8-9.
287 Id at 41-42 (citing no cases).
288 Id at 49.
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investigate and thereafter decide, checked primarily by political considerations, whether a regulated activity sufficiently affected interstate commerce. This holding reflected earlier doctrine (including
289
the interpretation in McCulloch of the necessary and proper clause )
29
that established Congress' plenary power over commerce. 0 In cases
following Jones & Laughlin,29t the Court established that, because
Congress needs the power to judge the propriety of economic regulations in a modern national economy, legislative findings are relevant
to judicial ratification vel non of Congress' judgment. 292 The "affecting commerce" standard judicially evolved from a question of law to
one of fact. Professor Cox described the practical necessity for this:
For a short time the Court sought to reserve judicial power over
the ultimate question of degree, saying that federal regulation
cannot be extended to "effects upon interstate commerce so indirect [as to] . ..create a completely centralized government." It
soon became apparent, however, that no court was capable of
drawing such a29line
in terms appropriate for continuing judicial
3
administration.
The degree to which a regulated subject affects commerce is characterized today as a question of fact not because it is in some tangible
sense a "fact," but because the modern Court appreciates the subject
294
matter's political nature.
289 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); see note 55supra (standard of
appropriateness in McCulloch).
290 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
291 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100 (1941).
292 See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 755 (1982). See also note 190 supra (Whether
legislative facts are relevant to a constitutional question is a matter of federal law reserved for
Court.).
293 Cox, upra note 12, at 225 (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1,
37 (1937)).
294 The Court will not decide on the merits a question that it deems "political" in nature.
See, e.g., Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454 (1939) (whether state ratification of constitutional amendment is valid is question for Congress). In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217
(1962), the Court deliniated situations in which political questions would be found:
[If there is] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack ofjudically discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a
court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect
due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
The notion that the political question doctrine properly applied to situations where no
legal standards were judicially ascertainable was criticized in ScharpfJudicialReview and the
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Congress' current power to resolve in binding fashion questions
of degree under the commerce clause is based more upon necessities
of social and economic life than upon transcending constitutional
principles determining which branch is best able to make law or find
fact. 295 The legal collapse of economic substantive due process was

directly related to a belated recognition by the Supreme Court that
the social and economic order in the United States was "more chosen
than given.

' 296

Today, the need for experimentation and doctrinal

flexibility in matters of economic and social policy is openly acknowledged by the Court, and its recognition of that need is often accompanied by a snub directed at the older, discredited doctrine.2 97 It has
Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517, 555-60 (1966). Under Scharpf's
"functional" analysis, emphasis is placed on the Court's inability to apply existing legal principles to the policy in issue.
Relevant here, Galebach strongly implied that whether life begins at conception is a
political question. See Galebach, supra note 12, at 5. The characterization is not persuasive,
however, because the Court repeatedly has shown its willingness to define "person" under the
14th amendment "in concrete application to" various entities. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 158 (1973) (unborn not persons); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 323-24
(states not persons); Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 154 (1897) (corporations are persons); Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886)
(same). Cf Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857) (Negroes not citizens);
Associated Gen. Contracters of California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 103
S. Ct. 897, 913 (1983) (labor union not a "person . . . injured in his business or property"
under the Clayton Act); Monroe v. Pope, 365 U.S. 167, 191 (1961) ("municipal corporation is
not a "person" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
777 (political speech no less protected under first amendment because it comes from corporation rather than individual). These cases establish that interpreting the scope of constitutional personhood must be reserved for the Court. See Emerson, The Power of Congress to Change
ConstitutionalDecisions of the Supreme Court: The Human Life Bill, 77 Nw. U.L. REv. 129, 133
(1982) (Court must decide question).
Moreover, the Roe Court pointed out that when life "begins" is not relevant to its constitutional holding regarding the legal status of the unborn. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 158-59.
But cf id at 156 (if personhood established, "appellant's case. . . collapses"). At no time did
the Court imply that personhood status under the 14th amendment is a question of fact for
legislative determination, cf. id at 162 ("[Wle do not agree that, by adopting one theory of
life, [the state] may override the rights of the pregnant woman that are at stake."); City of
Akron v. Akron Ctr. For Reproductive Health, 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983) (same).
295 Cf Ely, The Wages of Crying Wof A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE LJ. 920, 945
(1973) (Constitutional terms are "more or less suitable pegs on which judicial policy choices
are hung.") (quoting Linde, supra note 210, at 254).
296 L. TRIBE, supra note 17 1, at 447 (emphasis and footnote omitted).
297 See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1970). National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), appears in this context to be an anachronism. See EEOC
v. Wyoming 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983) (Extension of Age Discrimination in Employment Act to
cover state and local governments does not impair states' ability to structure their integral
operations; Act upheld as valid exercise of commerce power.). Cf FERC v. Mississippi, 456
U.S. 742, 769 (1982) (Utility Act does not represent "compelled exercise of [state's] sovereign
powers.").
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been accepted as a matter of policy in this area that the political
process affords individuals sufficient protection against arbitrary ex298
ercises of legislative power.
B.

Administrative Practice

Commerce clause jurisprudence illustrates that the practical
need for experimentation or flexibility in forming policy may lead to
the characterization of evaluative judgments (i.e., those of degree) as
findings of fact. Another reason why judgments are sometimes characterized as facts, and thus as fit for nonjudicial resolution, is because
the decisionmaker possesses particular expertise in the subject matter
area. Judicial deference to determinations born of expertise, and the
consequent characterization of such judgments as "facts," may be
seen in the relationship between the courts and administrative
agencies.
Distinguishing between law and fact is critical in administrative
practice. The labels have important ramifications concerning the
power of a reviewing court over decisions made by an administrative
agency. 299 As a term of art, the definition of "basic facts" comports
with traditional and commonsense understanding 3°° of what facts
are: "A finding of fact is the assertion that a phenomenon has happened or is or will be happening independent of or anterior to its
legal effect. It can, for example, be made by a person who is ignorant
of the applicable law."'30 1 Judicial review of agency factfinding is
very deferential. 30 2 But agency interpretations of law are subject to
de novo review. 30 3 The law and fact labels were and are used by
courts to justify levels of review consistent with their notions of
agency expertise.
In early administrative law cases, reviewing courts attempted to
exert judicial control over agency policymaking by importing a "jurisdictional" 30 4 or "constitutional" 30 5 element into otherwise basic
298
299
300
301
302

Cf McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 383.
L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, 546-48 (1965).
See text accompanying notes 262-66 supra (defining "fact").
L. JAFFE, supra note 299, at 548.
See Pierce & Shapiro, supra note 168, at 1183 (citing 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW TREATISE § 29.01 (1958)).

303 Id at 1182. See also W. GELLHORN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CASES AND COMMENTS
251 (1979).
304 See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 64 (1932) (Agency finding that maritime injury
occurred "upon the navigable waters of the United States" and that employer-employee relationship existed may be determined de novo by court.).
305 See St. Joseph Stockyards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38,52 (1936) (Agency finding
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facts, in order to justify the de novo review thought to be required by
article III. Underlying the jurisdictional and constitutional fact doctrines was evidently a judicial distrust of decisionmaking by indirectly accountable administrative agencies. Today, distrust of the
administrative process has waned, and the trend is in the other direction. As administrative practice becomes more prevalent, regularized, 30 6 and necessary, 30 7 reviewing courts are increasingly
predisposed not only to accept agency findings of basic fact, but also
30 8
to ratify almost summarily agency applications of law to the facts.
The courts sometimes characterize agency applications of law to the
basic facts as findings of "ultimate fact."
These ultimate facts are inferential rather than empirical 30 9 and
are determined by holding evidence up against a statutory standard.31 0 Findings of ultimate fact therefore encompass agencies' in-

terpretations of law. The policy reason for allowing agencies this
latitude, however, has great force. In their daily exposure to and discovery of basic facts occurring in myriad cases arising under the authorizing statute, agencies develop expertise in characterizing
evidence or assessing behavior against the statutory standard. 31 ' In
addition, the nature of the basic facts found may preclude reviewing
courts from questioning the agencies' application of law to the basic
of fact that jeopardizes constitutional liberty or property interest is subject to de novo
review.).
306 Congress passed the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1001-11, in 1946.
307 See, e.g., Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHA Rev. Comm., 430 U.S. 442, 444-46 (1977) (After
finding existing state statutory and common law actions inadequate to protect workers, Congress established a commission and a new statutory duty.).
308 For an early example, see NLRB v. Hearst Pub., Inc., 332 U.S. 111, 131 (1944)
(Board's application of statutory term "employee" affirmed). See also Griggs v. Duke Power,
401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971) (Court deferred to agency's application of statutory term "professionally developed ability test.").
309 Cedar Rapids Steel Transp., Inc. v. Iowa State Commerce Comm'n, 160 N.W.2d 825,
837-38 (Iowa 1968) (Ultimate fact is not a mere recital of a statutory standard, but rather,
"determined by a process of reasoning and inference from basic facts.") (citing 2 Am. Jur. 2d,
Administrative Law § 456 (1962) and K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 16.06 (1959)),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 918 (1959). But see Jaffe, JudicialReview: "SubstantialEvidence on the Whole
Record," 64 HARV. L. REV. 1233, 1242 (1951) (all factfinding involves inferences).
310 See United States v. Pierce Auto Freight Lines, Inc., 327 U.S. 515, 532-33 (1946) (ICC
applying § 207(a) of Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 305(a), to determine as an ultimate fact whether license applicant is "fit, willing, and able properly to perform the service
proposed"); Saginaw Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 96 F.2d 554, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1938) (finding of
ultimate fact "usually in the language of the statute"), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 613 (1938).
311 See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 137-40 (1944). Cf Katzenbach v. Morgan,
384 U.S. at 658; Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. at 502-03 (Powell, J., concurring) (congressional expertise in devising legislative remedies for racial discrimination).
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facts.3 12 Accordingly, agencies' ultimate determinations of statutory
applications to basic facts should be, and often are, given great
weight by reviewing courts. 31 3
Because the ultimate fact doctrine is used instrumentally by
courts to facilitate policy regarding the proper scope of judicial review, it has been rejected when its application would prevent rather
than justify judicial deference to an expert factfinder's decision. Pullman-Standard v. Swint 3 14 presents a sufficiently analogous context in

which to illustrate this point, even though it concerns appellate review of a trial court's findings rather than an agency's. In PullmanStandard, the Supreme Court dealt with the question of whether,

under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 31 5 a trial court's finding of
discriminatory intent was one of fact, and therefore subject to review

under the clearly erroneous standard. 31 6 The court of appeals ruled
that the trial court's finding of no intent could be reversed under a
312 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1944) (Courts cannot challenge
Congressional and military finding that "unascertained number of disloyal" citizens justified
relocation of those of Japanese origin. Executive Order 9066 authorized Secretary of War
and military commander to "prescribe military areas in such places . . . as he . . . may

determine, from which any or all persons may be excluded" in order to provide "every possible protection against espionage and against sabotage.") (citing Hirabayashi v. United States,
320 U.S. 81, 85-86 (1943)).
313 A reviewing court will not, without some independent analysis, defer to an agency's
interpretation of law. Pierce & Shapiro, note 168 supra, at 1183. My point is that, partly
through the use of the ultimate fact doctrine, a court can justify an extremely deferential
stance towards an agency's legal application and, more often than not, ratify it.
Usually the courts' deferential standard of review is expressed in terms of the rational
basis test. Pierce & Shapiro, note 168 supra, at 1183. The authors listed five policy reasons
why a reviewing court may choose to defer to agency interpretation of law:
First, the [Administrative Procedure Act] arguably does not compel de novo review
of all questions of law. . . . Second, agency interpretations of statutory provisions
are often so inextricably bound to factual and policy issues that de novo review
would constitute undue interference in the agency's factfinding or policymaking
process. Third, the agency is often best suited to understand how it is supposed to
pursue the congressional purposes underlying a statute. Fourth, uniformity should
be enhanced by deferring to reasonable agency interpretations of regulatory statutes. Fifth, in some circumstances, deference to agency statutory interpretations
may help protect the reliance interests of parties affected by the statute at issue.
Id at 1183 n.35 (citations omitted).
It is not clear whether an agency, when reciting the facts underlying its decision, must do
more than state the ultimate facts. Compare ICC v. Parker, 326 U.S. 60, reh g denied, 326 U.S.
803 (1945) (finding of "public interest, convenience, and necessity" insufficient alone to support agency ruling), with United States v. Pierce Auto Freight Lines, Inc., 327 U.S. at 533
(Failure to state clearly basic findings is not fatal where finding exists but is "inartistically
drawn.").
314 102 S. Ct. 1781 (1982).
315 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
316 Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 102 S. Ct. at 1791-92 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)).
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the strictures of rule 52" because intent is an
standard "free '3from
"ultimate fact." 17 The characterization superficially made sense because the statute expressly required a finding of "an intention to
discriminate."

3t 8

The Supreme Court rejected this position. It ruled in effect that
the trial court's finding of no intent was a basic fact, 3 19 therefore subject to reversal only if clearly erroneous. The Court noted that treatment of "issues of ihtent as a factual matter for the trier of fact is
commonplace, 3 20 thus implying that trial courts are most adept at
ascertaining questions of intent in the first instance. The Court held
that the trial court's finding should be deferred to by the reviewing
court under the clearly erroneous standard, regardless of whether the
finding of intent under the statute was characterized as a basic or
ultimate fact.321 The policy of encouraging deference to a department of government with expertise to make a reliable decision was
thus preserved not by use of the ultimate fact doctrine, but by carving out an exception to it.
C. Habeas Corpus
The writ of habeas corpus, which allows those imprisoned in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States to be released
or at least retried, has been called both a "great constitutional privilege" 32 2 and the "basic safeguard of freedom in the Anglo-American
world. '323 The Constitution expressly protects against the writ's suspension, 324 and Congress always has provided some form of habeas
325
jurisidiction in article III courts.
317 Id. at 1785-87.
318 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
319 Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 102 S. Ct. at 1785-87.
320 Id at 1790.
321 Id at 1792.
322 Exparle Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95 (1807).
323 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 512 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
324 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2, states that "The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public safety may
require it." The Court does not base its holdings concerning the scope or availability of
habeas on the suspension clause, however. It prefers instead to interpret Congress' statutory
grant of the writ. To the chagrin of those of all political persuasions, the Court has demonstrated a "historic willingness to overturn or modify its earlier views of the scope of the writ,
even where the statutory language authorizing judicial action has remained unchanged."
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 81 (1977).
325 The first Congress provided for issuance of the writ to those in the unlawful custody of
federal authorities. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch.20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81 (1789). The Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction to review denials of the writ, conferred in the Act of Feb. 5,
1867, ch.28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385-86 (1867) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)),
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Not until 1867, however, did Congress grant to those in state
custody the right to seek habeas relief.326 The flip side of this right
was the power given to federal district and appellate courts to invalidate state judgments of conviction. 327 This was a significant incursion into the traditional "hands off" relationship previously
maintained between the lower federal and state judiciaries. For over
one hundred years, the Supreme Court has balanced and rebalanced
the policies stemming from this development. Two important and
sometimes mutually exclusive policies are always at stake: vindication of the federal rights of state prisoners, and states' independent
administration of their own criminal laws and procedures. The decisions of the Court present a dynamic body of habeas jurisprudence,
which swings like a pendulum across time to favor first one policy
and then the other. 328 The distinction between questions of law and
fact plays a critical role in this development.
A mainstay of habeas doctrine is that habeas courts are not
bound by prior state court determinations of federal law. 329 However, the level of deference accorded state court determinations of
fact was, until recently, unclear. In Brown v. Allen,330 the Court initially suggested that "where there is material conflict of fact in the
transcripts of evidence as to deprivation of constitutional rights, the
District Court may properly depend upon the state's resolution of the
issue."' 33 ' However, this permissive deference to state factfinding did
was excepted by Congress in the Act of Mar. 27, 1868, ch.34, 15 Stat. 44 (1868). This exception was held within Congress' article III power in Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506,
513-15 (1869). The excepted appellate jurisdiction was restored shortly thereafter by Congress. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 409-10 (1963).
326 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385-86 (1867) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254
(1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
327 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 469 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
328 It is not necessary to review here the complex development of habeas doctrine from its
inception. See, however, the excellent compendium in P. BATOR, HART & WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1424-514 (2d ed. 1973 & Supp. 1981). For an

example of the Court's switch in emphasis from federal protection of federal rights to protection of state autonomy, compare Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (writ available as of right
despite state procedural default absent petitioner's "deliberate bypass") with Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (Procedural default bars grant of writ unless petitioner establishes
"cause" for default and "actual prejudice" resulting therefrom.).
329 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. at 506 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). The apparent reason for
this is that federal courts are deemed to have more expertise in determining questions of
federal law, and because state judges may not be able to resist "popular pressures not experienced by federal judges given lifetime tenure." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 525 (1976)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
330 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
331 Id at 458. Accord Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. at 422.
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not apply when "the ascertainment of the historical facts does not
dispose of the claim but calls for interpretation of the legal signifi3 32
cance of such facts."
In Townsend v. Sain,333 the Court set forth circumstances 334 under
which the habeas court must redetermine the material facts by holding a full evidentiary hearing. 335 Congress responded by grafting on
33 7
to the habeas statute3 36 a near codification of Townsend's criteria.
332 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. at 507 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). Justice Frankfurter spoke
for a majority of the Court on this point.
As an example of a "mixed" question of law and fact, Justice Frankfurter referred to
"the question whether established primary facts underlying a confession prove that the confession was coerced or voluntary .. " Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. at 507. Used in this fashion, mixed questions of law and fact are analogous to the "ultimate facts" described in the
preceding section. See notes 309-13 supra and accompanying text.
333 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
334 Id. at 312-13. In his typical quasi-statutory fashion, cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 479 (1966), Chief Justice Warren listed the circumstantial defects in state factfinding
procedure that mandated an evidentiary hearing on habeas:
We hold that a federal court must grant an evidentiary hearing to a habeas applicant under the following circumstances: If (1) the merits of the factual dispute were
not resolved in the state hearing; (2) the state factual determination is not fairly
supported by the record as a whole; (3) the fact-finding procedure employed by the
state court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence; (5) the material facts were not adequately developed at the state-court hearing; or (6) for any reason it appears that
the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas applicant a full and fair fact hearing.
372 U.S. at 313. The common denominator linking these circumstances was that in none did
"the state-court trier of fact . . . after a full hearing[,] reliably [find] the relevant facts." Id
Cf Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 91-92 (1923) (Habeas court may redetermine facts of
whether state trial was mob-dominated.).
335 Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. at 313.
336 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976).
337 Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-711, 80 Stat. 1104, 1105 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d) (1976)). The section provides that:
In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an applicant for a writ of habeas
corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a State court of
competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the applicant for the writ and the
State or an officer or agent thereof were parties, evidenced by a written finding,
written opinion, or other reliable and adequate written indicia, shall be presumed to
be correct, unless the applicant shall establish or it shall otherwise appear, or the
respondent shall admit(1) that the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the State court
hearing;
(2) that the factfinding procedure employed by the State court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing;
(3) that the material facts were not adequately developed at the State court
hearing;
(4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or over the
person of the applicant in the State court proceeding;
(5) that the applicant was an indigent and the State court, in deprivation of his
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Section 2254(d) currently provides that, in the absence of any statutory criteria authorizing de novo factfinding by the habeas court, the
state court's factfinding "shall be presumed to be correct." This con338
trasted with Townsend's precatory holding on the point.
This history, culminating in congressional passage of section
2254(d), sets the stage upon which the characterization as law or fact
of state court findings takes on crucial significance in habeas jurisprudence. The habeas court may dismiss the former ab initio, while
the latter is binding absent direct application of a precise statutory
exception.
Sumner v. Maa3 3 9 ("Mata I") illustrates how the Supreme Court
constitutional right, failed to appoint counsel to represent him in the State court
proceeding;
(6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate hearing in the
State court proceeding; or
(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of law in the State
court proceeding;,
(8) or unless that part of the record of the State court proceeding in which the
determination of such factual issue was made, pertinent to a determination of the
sufficiency of the evidence to support such factual determination, is produced as
provided for hereinafter, and the Federal court on a consideration of such part of
the record as a whole concludes that such factual determination is not fairly supported by the record: And in an evidentiary hearing in the proceeding in the Federal court, when due proof of such factual determination has been made, unless the
existence of one or more of the circumstances respectively set forth in paragraphs
numbered (1) to (7), inclusive, is shown by the applicant, otherwise appears, or is
admitted by the respondent, or unless the court concludes pursuant to the provisions
of paragraph numbered (8) that the record in the State court proceeding, considered as a whole, does not fairly support such factual determination, the burden shall
rest upon the applicant to establish by convincing evidence that the factual determination by the State court was erroneous.
338 Townsend set forth circumstances mandating an evidentiary hearing on habeas. See
note 334 supra. It did not preclude the federal judge from holding a hearing in the exercise of
sound discretion, 372 U.S. at 318, even if the petitioner was afforded a "full and fair hearing
by the state court." Id Cf Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. at 438 (district judge has discretion to deny
writ to petitioner who deliberately bypassed state procedures.).
The Townsend Court stated that the district judge "ordinarily should" accept state court
factfindings made in the context of adequate procedures. 372 U.S. at 318. This was sound
policy apart from federalism concerns.
[F]actfindings are efforts to ascertain what actually happened . . .fact finders are
deferred to because they are closer to the truth. . . . [B]ecause of the uncertainties
of fact-finding, often compounded in habeas corpus by delay, it simply is not practicable [for federal courts] to review the facts as broadly as the law.
Wright & Sofaer, FederalHabeas Corpus ForStatePrsoners: The Allocation of Fact-FindingResponsibility,
75 YALE LJ.895, 920 n.67 (1966). The authors concluded: "If cooperation from the
states is expected, they are entitled to reasons, and to good reasons, every time their records or
findings are deemed inadequate." Id at 922 (footnote omitted).
339 449 U.S. 539 (1981). The Supreme Court vacated and remanded, id at 772, and the
circuit court reconsidered its prior decision. See Mata v. Sumner, 649 F.2d 713 (9th Cir.
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uses the law and fact labels instrumentally in its habeas jurisdiction
to further current federalism policy. In Mata I, the Supreme Court
first held that under section 2254(d) habeas courts must presume that
the state court's findings of fact are correct, whether they are found
in the first instance by the state trial or appellate court. 340 If the
habeas court concludes that a statutory criterion is present to negate
this presumption, or that the state court's findings are otherwise "not
supported by the record,

' 341

the habeas court must specifically set

342
forth the reasoning leading to its conclusion.
The Mata I Court then proceeded to determine whether the
habeas court had complied with this interpretation of section
2254(d). In the case, the California Court of Appeal had found that
a challenged pretrial photo identification procedure conducted by
the police did not violate the defendant's due process rights. 343 The
1981). The Supreme Court granted certiorari and summarily vacated and remanded once
again. Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591 (per curiam) (1982) ("Aala II"). The most recent
circuit court reconsideration of the case is at 696 F.2d 1244 (9th Cir. 1983).
340 Aata 1, 449 U.S. at 546-47. The Court noted that § 2254(d) applied to state court
"determination[s] after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue," and that the statute
"makes no distinction between the factual determinations of a state trial court and those of a
state appellate court." Id a 546. The Court held that, in Mata's case, the state appellate
court conducted a "hearing" that met the requirements of § 2254(d). Id at 546. This holding was not challenged by the dissenters.
The Ma/a I opinion reasoned that federal deference to all state court findings of fact was
required because of the "interest in federalism recognized by Congress in enacting § 2254(d)."
Id at 547. Deference to state appellate court findings of fact based solely upon examination
of the trial record does not otherwise seem justifiable, however. For example, the reasons
advanced by Wright & Sofaer, note 338 supra, at 920 n.67, in support of federal courts' deference to state trial courts' findings of fact, are not applicable when the findings are not based
upon evaluations of live testimony. Functionally, there is no difference between a state appellate or federal appellate court's parsing the trial record to ascertain the facts.
341 Section § 2254(d) allows the habeas court to determine the facts de novo, even though
a more narrow statutory criterion is absent, if the habeas applicant establishes by "convincing
evidence" that the record does not "fairly" support the state court's findings of fact. 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1976).
342 Matal, 449 U.S. at 551. Cf FED. R. Civ. P. 52 (At civil bench trial, court must state
facts specially.); FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(c) (At criminal bench trial, defendant can have judge
state special findings.).
343 Mata 1, 449 U.S. at 542. Mata was convicted of first degree murder for the stabbing
death of a fellow inmate at a California prison. On appeal, he raised for the first time a due
process objection to a pretrial photo identification procedure used by police to secure an
eyewitness identification at trial. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968)
(Due process is violated if a photo procedure is "impermissively suggestive as to give rise to a
very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification."). Because the objection to the
eyewitness' identification was not timely made, see 449 U.S. at 541-42, the California Court of
Appeal was not obligated to consider the issue. Id at 547 (citing Souza v. Howard, 488 F.2d
462 (1st Cir. 1973)). But cf.Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 448-49 (1965) (Procedural
default does not bar Supreme Court on direct review if interests served by state's procedure
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state appellate court recited findings to support its holding:
Reviewing the facts of the present case to determine if the
particular photographic identification procedure used contained
the proscribed suggestive characteristics, we first find that the
photographs were available for cross-examination purposes at the
trial. We further find that there is no showing of influence by the
investigating officers[;] that the witnesses had an adequate opportunity to view the crime; and that their descriptions are accurate.
The circumstances thus indicate the inherent fairness of the prowe find no error in the admission of the identification
cedure, and
344
evidence.

On a habeas petition, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reviewed the same record as the state appellate court and applied the
same legal standard to it.3 4 5 Finding that the photo identification
procedure violated Mata's due process rights, the Ninth Circuit reversed his conviction based upon its findings that:
(1) the circumstances surrounding the witnesses' observation of
the crime were such that there was a grave likelihood of misidentification; (2) the witnesses had failed to give sufficiently detailed
descriptions of the assailant; and (3) considerable pressure from
both prison officials
and prison factions had been brought to bear
3 46
on the witnesses.
The Mata I Court held that because the circuit court did not refer to
section 2254(d) in its opinion and accord the "factual determination"
of the state appeals court a presumption of correctness, 3 47 its judg348
ment must be vacated and remanded.
Justice Brennan dissented, 34 9 criticizing the majority's reliance
can be met at different time.). However, the California Court of Appeals considered and
rejected Mata's due process claim on the merits, and recorded the findings based upon its
consideration of the trial record. See text accompanying note 344 infra.
344 Mata i, 449 U.S. at 542. These findings were based upon the state appellate court's
evaluation of the criteria provided by the Supreme Court in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188
(1972). See note 345 infra (listing criteria).
345 See Mata I, 449 U.S. at 556 (Brennan, J., dissenting). To determine whether the photo
procedure produced a likelihood of misidentification, both the state appellate and circuit
courts applied the "totality of the circumstances" test detailed in Neil v. Biggtrs. Each court's
findings were based upon its respective evaluations of "the opportunity of the witness to view
the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime
and the confrontation." 409 U.S. at 199-200. See Mata 1, 449 U.S. at 542.
346 Mata I, 449 U.S. at 543.
347 See id. at 547.
348 Mata I, 449 U.S. at 552.
349 Id (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justices Marshall and Stevens joined the dissent.
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upon section 2254(d). 350 He could not find any demonstrated disagreement between the state appellate and federal circuit court over
35 1 Justice
the "basic, primary, or historical fact[s]" in the record.
Brennan did not view the state appellate court's findings as factual,
thereby falling within the restriction of section 2254(d), because the
findings were stated sparsely, in conclusory fashion, and did not include detailed references to the specific underlying historical circumstances of the case.3 52 Moreover, it was undisputed that the circuit
court did not conduct its own evidentiary hearing. Rather, it relied
upon the same record used by the state appellate court. 353 Justice
Brennan concluded that the disparate state appellate and circuit
court findings were their respective legal conclusions of whether the
circumstances surrounding the photo identification satisfied due process requirements. 3 54 The conflicting findings, he asserted, were
made pursuant to "questions of law, or at least mixed questions of
fact and law. ' 355 The state appellate .and circuit courts disagreed
about "the constitutional significance of the facts of the case, and not
over the facts themselves.1 356 Consequently, it was "obvious" that
350 Justice Brennan first objected to the the Court's use of § 2254(d) because the statute
was not cited in a timely fashion by the state on appeal. Id at 554. He noted that § 2254(d)
was not mentioned in the briefs filed with the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and
that "except in exceptional circumstances, a court need not search the universe of legal argument and discuss every contention that might have been-but was not-made by the losing
party." Id at 554. Moreover, he argued that the Court's required statement of why
§ 2254(d) did not prevent a de novo determination of the facts on habeas "is. . . likely to be
seen as an invitation to lower federal courts to 'inser[t] a boilerplate paragraph' in their opinions acknowledging their awareness of § 2254(d)." Id.
351 Id at 555-56.
352 Id at 556-57.
353 Id. at 556.
354 Id at 557.
355 Id Justice Brennan added that § 2254(d) did not prevent habeas courts from exercising their "well-established duty" to apply independently principles of federal law to state
court factfindings. Id at 558-59 (citing Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. at 318).
356 Id at 556-57. Justice Brennan supported his conclusion by briefly discussing Neil v.
Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972). Biggers involved the propriety under the due process clause of a
station house showup procedure used by police to obtain a rape victim's identification of a
suspect. Both the federal district and appellate courts ruled on habeas that, applying the
"totality of the circumstances" test, the procedure was "so suggestive as to violate due process." Id at 190. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, id. at 201, despite the dissent's
argument that "findings of fact concurred in by two lower courts" should not be lightly reversed. Id at 202 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The majority found the lower courts' factual
findings clearly erroneous, id at 200, but more importantly stated that the dispute was "not
so much over the elemental facts as over the constitutional significance to be attached to
them." Id at 193 n.3.
Although Justice Brennan's Mala I dissent overstated the matter by saying that the Biggers Court "rejected the dissenter's argument on the basis of its conclusion that application of
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section 2254(d) was inapplicable to the case. 357

On remand, the Ninth Circuit adopted Justice Brennan's con358 It
clusion that section 2254(d) was not relevant to its decision.
characterized the state appellate court's finding that no circumstances pointed toward impermissible suggestiveness as a mixed question of fact and law, 359 and therefore did not consider itself bound
360

under section 2254(d) by the state appellate court's determination.

36 1
readopted its previous findings in toto.362
The circuit court majority
363

The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and in Sumner v. Mata
("Mata II") summarily vacated the circuit court's judgment and remanded once again. 364 The brief per curiam opinion conceded that
the ultimate constitutionality of Mata's photo identification was a
mixed question of law and fact 365 but admonished the circuit court

that the "questions of fact that underlie this conclusion are governed
by § 2254(d). '36 6 The mandate sent back to the circuit court was to
face up to any disagreement as to the facts and defer to the state
appellate court findings, 367 or to explain, through the use of section
2254(d)'s criteria, why the statutory presumption should not
3 68
apply.
the 'totality of the circumstances' test to the undisputed primary facts in the trial court record
did not constitute a factual finding," 449 U.S. at 558, he was correct in citing the case to
establish that the subject of the conflicting findings in Afata I concerned "at least mixed question of fact and law." Id at 557.
357 Id at 559.
ee Mata v. Sumner, 649 F.2d 713, 715-16 (9th Cir. 1981).
358
359 Id at 716-17.
360 Id at 717.
361 For the second time, Circuit Judge Sneed dissented "respectfully, and to some degree
sorrowfully." Id at 717.
362 Id at 714. Indeed, the only new recognition made by the circuit court was that
§ 2254(d) "is not in this case." Id at 716.
363 455 U.S. 591 (1982) (per curiam).
364 Id at 548.
365 Id at 597.
366 Id at 1307 (emphasis in original). The Court acknowledged that "the distinction between law and fact is not always easily drawn," but expressly stated that § 2254(d) applied to
questions of "historical fact" (mentioning Biggers factors for evaluating likelihood of misidentification listed in note 345 suipra). Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens dissented. 445
U.S. at 599.
367 Mata II, 455 U.S. at 598.
368 Id On remand, the circuit court did exactly that. It first read Mata II to hold that
§ 2254(d) was indeed applicable to the state appellate court findings, some of which were
"considerably at odds with" the findings made on habeas. Mata v. Sumner, 696 F.2d 1244,
1250-51 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing Mata II). Then, after a painstaking consideration of the trial
record and the state court findings in light of § 2254(d)'s presumption of correctness, the
circuit court concluded that "some of the [state appeals court] findings are not fairly supported by the record." Id at 1251. See Mata If, 455 U.S. at 597 (suggesting this option to
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Plainly, the quarrel between the majority and dissenters in
Mata I and Mata II was not over whether the presence or absence of
circumstances establishing impermissible suggestiveness posed a
question of law or fact. The issue was whether the matter should be
decided in binding fashion by federal or state courts. The underlying
federalism policy at stake cannot be ignored when attempting to understand why the Supreme Court held that the presence or absence
3 69 Jusof such circumstances was properly a factual determination.
tice Rehnquist's opinion for the Mata I Court derived largely from
federalism concerns "recognized by Congress," inherent in the "fric3 70
tion" caused by federal habeas review of state court judgments.
The dissenters stressed the "duty" of federal courts to review independently the federal questions presented on habeas. 37' The opinions did not delve into the intrinsic nature of the matter in issue (i.e.,
is that a "fact"?), but merely used the terms "law" and "fact" as
shorthand to justify policy conclusions concerning the proper allocation of judicial power to federal and state courts under section
2254(d).
D. Summary
These trends in national economic legislation, administrative
practice, and habeas corpus illustrate that characterizing a matter as
one of law or a fact is no more than a conclusion, based upon an
circuit court). Relying on its own determination surrounding the photo identification, the
circuit court again concluded that Mata's due process rights had been violated, 696 F.2d at
1255, and again reversed his conviction. Id at 1256.
369 See Reynolds, Sumner v. Mata: Twi/ght's Last Gleaming For Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State Court Convictions? Speculations on the Futureof the Great Writ, U. ARK. LITTLE RocK
L.J. 289, 290-91 (1981) (Mata I is significant when read together with "Court's restrictive
approach to the writ."). The author did not expand upon this view, however. Instead, he
unfortunately resorted to the same conclusory rhetoric used by the Court when he contended
that Ma/a I was problematic because "the case turned on 'facts' that are not facts .... " Id
at 301. This criticism is conclusory because it does not follow from an examination of the
policy underlying the characterization. In contrast, one recent commentator recognized that
by its use of the fact-law distinction in Mata I and Ma/a II, the Supreme Court "obscurred the
important policy concerns underlying the scope of [federal] deference to state findings [on
habeas]." Note, Sumner v. Mata: Muddying The Waters of FederalHabeas Court Deference to State
Court Findings, 1983 Wisc. L. REV. 751, 787. The author noted that the reliance upon the
"fact" label in such cases presents the danger of "result oriented decisionmaking" by the
courts. Id at 778 (footnote omitted).
370 See Mata 1,449 U.S. at 550. Cf Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 88-91 (Rehnquist, J.)
(recognizing importance of state procedural rules).
371 See Mata , 449 U.S. at 558 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Cf Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. at 42122 (Brennan, J.) (recognizing that federal law is often more important than state procedural
requirements).
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evaluation of pertinent policies, that one branch of government
rather than another should make the decision in question. In these
areas of the law, functional or ideological judgments, colored with
rhetorical distinctions between law and fact, are made concerning
the Court's proper relationship with Congress, agencies, appellate
and trial courts, and the states. The rhetorical characterizations do
not truly reflect' 372
whether the matters in question are intrinsically
"law" or "fact.
In short, there is more to the characterizations
than the rhetoric admits.
In its modern examinations of the rationality of enforcement
legislation under the post-Civil War amendments, the Supreme
Court has checked to see that Congress was aware of facts establishing a need for legislative action. 373 For without such need, the legislation would not rationally relate to the substantive amendment.
The cases permit the inference that the Court is not likely to find the
legislation unconstitutional if it finds that sufficient supporting facts
exist. It necessarily follows, then, as in the three areas of law just
surveyed, that characterizing legislative findings as "facts" will more
often than not determine the outcome in enforcement clause cases.
Proponents of the factfinding theory do not acknowledge this
point. Because of the binding effect of characterizing findings as
"facts," the mere assertion that a finding is factual cannot persuasively establish Congress' enforcement role in a particular area, nor
should it ensure judicial deference.37 4 The propriety of allowing
Congress alone to set national civil rights policy in an area must first
be examined. For example, whether Congress can determine as a
matter of fact that human life begins at conception depends upon an
evaluation of the various policy considerations for and against reestablishing a legislative role in regulating women's choices concerning
abortions. This policy analysis is imperative because where the facts
are outcome determinative, policy considerations are inextricably
tied to the characterization of findings as "facts." The policy considerations must first be settled, in order to rely upon the factfinding
theory, because the findings cannot properly be called factual until
then. Also, and perhaps most importantly, proponents of the
372 See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 102 S. Ct. at 1796 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (discussing the matter in terms of "controlling legal issues" and "effective judicial administration").
373 See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. at 490; Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392
U.S. at 427, 440-41.
374 Cf Pennhurst State School Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1981) (Congressional findings are "generalized statements of federal policy," not predicates for new legal
rights.).
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factfinding theory must concede that the final characterization of a
question as one of fact or law is ultimately reserved in our system for
the Supreme Court.
IV. Conclusion
In order to be helpful, the debate over the proper scope of congressional power under the post-Civil War amendments must be separated from the "vexing . . . distinction between questions of fact
and questions of law. '3 75 Instead, we should forthrightly address the

issue of whether policy considerations in a particular area work to
expand or contract the functions we give an institution to perform.
Perhaps Justice Harlan recognized this in his Oregon dissent: "Judicial deference is based, not on relative factfinding competence, but
on due regard for the decision of the body constitutionally appointed
to decide. '376 His characterization of the issue was incomplete only
because it did not acknowledge (or admit) that determining which
institution is "constitutionally appointed" to be preeminent in a particular area is itself a policy decision-one reserved to the judiciary.
This article has identified two flaws in the factfinding theory
used to justify enhanced congressional power under the post-Civil
War amendments. First, an examination of the different factfinding
procedures used by legislatures and courts shows that neither can
claim in the abstract that it possesses an absolutely superior capability to find and use facts to support its decisionmaking. The particularities of the issues considered, personalities involved, and
institutional constraints must be figured into any analysis of factfinding competence. Second, and more importantly, the factfinding theory is misleading; it relies upon the term "fact," which embraces
highly subjective policy concepts, without acknowledging the term's
conclusory nature. Use of the term to justify a realignment of the
relative power of Congress and the Supreme Court with regard to
abortion policy, or any other policy, without initially analyzing the
issues surrounding the realignment of authority itself, cannot help
but be incomplete.

375 Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 102 S. Ct. at 1789.
376 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 152, (Harlan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).

